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Introduction 
What are the ethical limits of a lawyer’s advocacy in civil 
litigation? Lawyers, courts, and scholars struggle with this question,1 
 
† Douglas Arant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of 
Law. 
1. For a sampling of the modern academic debate as to litigation advocacy, 
see Colloquium, What Does It Mean to Practice Law “in the Interests of 
Justice” in the Twenty-First Century?, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1543 
(2002), with a keynote address by Professor Deborah Rhode and 
contributions by many of the leading scholars of legal ethics. A key 
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but the concern is not new. It is centuries old. Most modern studies of 
historical legal-ethics debate focus on the early twentieth century, 
when the American Bar Association (ABA) formulated its first set of 
national model ethical standards.2 Some scholars have studied the 
ethical discourse in the nineteenth century,3 when the likes of Lord 
Brougham (in 1820),4 David Hoffman (in 1836),5 David Dudley Field 
(in 1850),6 and George Sharswood (in 1854)7 expressed their views of 
proper litigation advocacy. The concern for proper litigation conduct, 
 
actor in this debate is Professor Monroe Freedman. He is the best-
known modern advocate of an ideal of zealous advocacy. See Monroe 
H. Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System 9–24 
(1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics 
65 (1990) [hereinafter Freedman, Understanding Ethics].  
2. For a discussion of the 1908 ABA effort, see James M. Altman, 
Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 
2395 (2003), and Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New 
Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1, 6–
16 (1999). The first set of ABA standards was the 1908 Canons of 
Ethics and model oath. See Final Report of the Committee on Code of 
Professional Ethics, 33 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 567, 575–84 (1908) 
[hereinafter 1908 ABA Report] (reprinting original 1908 ABA Canons of 
Ethics and model oath). The second set was the ABA’s 1969 Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility. See Report of the Special 
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 
729, 734–96 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 ABA Report] (reprinting Model 
Code as adopted). The third set was the ABA’s 1983 Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. See Am. Bar Ass’n, A Legislative History: 
The Development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 1982–2005, at viii–ix (2006) [hereinafter Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Legislative History] (discussing adoption of Model Rules in 1983); 
see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2012) (current Model 
Rules, as amended). For a discussion on all three sets, see infra Part III.  
3. See M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The “Other 
Tradition,” 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 793 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, 
Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, 
and Unsound Adversary Ethics, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 697 (1988); Norman 
W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the 
Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1397 (2003); 
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy 
Ethics, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 35–67 (2005). I discuss the 
nineteenth-century debate in Part III, infra. 
4. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing Lord Brougham and the views attributed 
to him). 
5. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Hoffman’s views on litigation advocacy). 
6. See infra Part III.C (discussing David Dudley Field and the “Field Code” 
position on litigation advocacy). 
7. See infra Part III.B.3 (examining Sharswood’s position on litigation 
advocacy).  
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however, long predated the nineteenth century, perhaps extending 
back to ancient times. The actual ethical and practical struggles of 
lawyers in earlier eras are difficult to capture today, but the 
regulatory standards for their conduct give some insights to the 
litigation ethos of the period. In this Article, I explore the early 
history of formalized civil litigation duties and track these standards 
to the present day.  
In a previous article, I explored the general history of legal ethics 
standards and identified six core ethical principles that have governed 
lawyer conduct for centuries: litigation fairness, competence, loyalty, 
confidentiality, reasonable fees, and public service.8 In the present 
Article, I look more closely at the core value of litigation fairness in 
civil cases. Over the centuries, the concept of litigation fairness has 
included different duties and standards of conduct, including 
reasonable behavior, truth, just cause, proper motive, and objective 
merit. When imposed, these duties have been paramount over any 
conflicting client duties. Indeed, society has consistently limited a 
lawyer’s advocacy in civil litigation, through the duties of reasonable 
behavior and truth. The variance or evolution has come, in which 
additional duties—just cause, proper motive, and objective merit—
also limit a lawyer’s advocacy. 
I start, in Part I, by giving definition to the historical account. I 
identify and describe in general terms the various duties that might 
apply to a civil litigator. These duties fall in two broad groups: 
litigation duties to the client (competence, confidentiality, loyalty, 
and zealous advocacy) and duties to the court and opposing party 
(reasonable behavior, honesty, objective merit, proper motive, and 
just cause). The duties overlap somewhat, but each represents distinct 
values. Some of these litigation duties can be in tension with each 
other. 
In Part II, I examine historical litigation standards in Europe, 
from ancient times to the colonial era. The thin record of legal ethics 
duties in this broad time frame provides only a glimpse at the 
standards of the respective eras. Even these cursory records, however, 
reveal multiple litigation duties to the court and, importantly, the 
priority of the duties. The early European advocate’s duties to the 
 
8. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year 
Evolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385, 1387 (2004) [hereinafter Andrews, 
Evolution]. In other works, I explored other aspects of the history of 
legal ethics standards. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of 
the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, in 
Gilded Age Legal Ethics 7, 7 (2003) [hereinafter Gilded Age] 
(discussing the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar 
Association); Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s Oath: Both Ancient 
and Modern, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 3, 5 (2009) [hereinafter 
Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath] (examining both historical and modern 
lawyer’s oaths).  
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court, which included reasonable behavior, truth, and often just cause, 
were paramount over duties owed to the client.  
In Part III, I discuss litigation-ethics standards in the United 
States before the twentieth century. Early regulation was modest, but 
it tended to follow the English model of prioritizing reasonable and 
truthful litigation conduct. New attention to counsel in criminal cases 
prompted deeper consideration of all litigation duties. By the mid-
nineteenth century, scholars, lawyers, and regulators, such as 
Brougham, Hoffman, Field, and Sharswood, attempted to detail the 
ethical limits of litigation advocacy, in a variety of civil and criminal 
litigation settings. These attempts exposed some uncertainty, 
especially concerning zealous advocacy, on the one hand, and just 
cause, on the other. In the second half of the nineteenth century, new 
ethics regulation addressed litigation conduct in unprecedented detail. 
The new regulation continued to prioritize truth and reasonable 
behavior, but it did not conclusively settle the proper balance between 
zealous advocacy and other court duties. The new regulation 
experimented with different limits, including just cause, proper 
motive, and objective merit.  
In Part IV, I track the development of civil litigation duties in the 
twentieth century in the ABA model ethics standards. The initial 
ABA 1908 standards built upon the works of the late nineteenth 
century and stated a nuanced, arguably conflicting, set of civil-
litigation duties. Over the next century the ABA further refined and 
revised its model litigation standards, culminating in the current 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Reasonable behavior and truth, 
as always, remain paramount duties. Zealous advocacy rose and ebbed 
as an ideal in the model standards and has today become a concept of 
diligence. Likewise, just cause faded as an affirmative duty and 
morphed into, first, a proper-motive standard and then, today, a 
standard of objective merit. Yet, because the ABA standards are 
merely models, the older standards linger in actual regulatory 
standards, including many state oaths that impose a just-cause duty.  
Despite this evolution, or perhaps because of it, modern observers, 
particularly those in the academy, are not in agreement as to the 
proper standards for a civil litigator’s conduct.9 This debate is not 
unique to our generation. The debate did not start in 1908 or the 
nineteenth century. The concern for proper litigation conduct 
seemingly began with the profession itself. The debate, though 
centuries old, is fairly narrow. It is not whether a lawyer has a duty of 
full-out zealous advocacy on behalf of the client. The formal standards 
never have imposed such an unlimited duty. The question has not 
been whether a lawyer owes primary duties of truth and reasonable 
 
9. See Colloquium, supra note 1 (presenting several academic views on 
litigation ethics). 
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behavior. Lawyers always have had those duties. The question is 
instead which other duties, beyond reasonable behavior and truth, 
also limit a lawyer’s civil litigation advocacy.  
I. Defining a Lawyer’s Basic Duties in Civil Litigation  
No one can define or label all of a lawyer’s potential litigation 
duties with precision or with universal acceptance. Indeed, the defini-
tion of the lawyer’s ethical duties in litigation is at the heart of the 
debate both today and in preceding centuries. Nevertheless, some 
description is necessary to distinguish the duties from each other, and 
labels are useful shorthand references for study of the historical 
litigation ethics standards. 
My description of the duties here is necessarily general. I do not 
intend to capture every nuance of the duty or anticipate all 
applications of the duty. My intent is to describe each duty, in broad 
strokes, in order to contrast each from other litigation duties. I do not 
mean to suggest that a civil litigator is bound by all of the listed 
duties. My aim is to identify the duties that have frequently 
appeared, over time, in standards for litigation conduct.  
Further, I limit my description of the duties to civil litigation, as 
opposed to criminal cases. Many of the core ideals are the same in 
both contexts, but a lawyer’s duties may vary depending on whether 
the litigation is civil or criminal. In my discussion of the historical 
standards, I occasionally note the different context of criminal cases 
where that difference helped define the duty on the civil side.  
Finally, in my labelling of duties, I do not mean to suggest that 
the historical standards use the same terms. It is precisely because the 
terms vary over time and place that I attempt to provide consistent 
terminology for my exploration and comparison of the standards of 
conduct. My aims are to report on the different standards over time 
and to categorize them. This involves guesswork as to some 
standards. We cannot know with any certainty what particular terms 
meant in their respective eras. Even today, we do not have a uniform 
understanding of proper litigation conduct.  
A. A Civil Litigator’s Duties to the Client 
In this study, I consider four client duties in litigation: 
competence, confidentiality, loyalty, and zealous advocacy. The first 
three are relatively well understood, perhaps because they apply in all 
aspects of legal practice, not just civil litigation. Competence as 
applied to civil litigation requires the advocate to possess the basic 
skill and knowledge to litigate and to take steps to ensure such skill 
and knowledge.  Confidentiality means both voluntary preservation of 
the client’s private information and proper assertion of privilege 
during discovery and trial.  Loyalty requires that the lawyer not have 
a conflict between the client’s interests and those of the lawyer or 
other parties represented by the lawyer. 
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The most difficult client litigation duty to define is zealous 
advocacy. Zealous advocacy requires competence, confidentiality, and 
loyalty, but to most observers, it means something more. Zealous 
advocacy suggests a push for excellence. Zealous advocacy, to some 
observers, requires a strong desire to win and a willingness to “do all” 
to accomplish the client’s goals. It suggests a primacy of the client’s 
interests, perhaps above all others.  
The first three duties—competence, confidentiality and loyalty—are 
not the focus of this historical analysis. I note them as they appear in 
the historical works, but I do not detail their content or development 
over time. My aim in noting these duties is both to distinguish them 
from zeal and to demonstrate their position relative to the duties that 
the lawyer owed to the court. Zealous advocacy, on the other hand, is a 
primary focus of my review of the historical ethics standards, for it is 
the duty most at odds with the lawyer’s duties to the court.  
B. A Civil Litigator’s Duties to the Court 
A lawyer in civil litigation also owes duties to the court and to the 
opposing party. I use the shorthand “duties to the court” to encompass 
both, because, in a broad sense, the judicial system benefits when a 
lawyer acts appropriately with regard to both the court and opposing 
party.10 For this study, I identify five court duties: reasonable behavior, 
truth, objective merit, proper motive, and just cause.  
One duty is reasonable behavior. The broad concept of reason-
ableness could describe all of the court-oriented duties. My description 
of this reasonableness duty here focuses on the lawyer’s behavior, 
rather than the litigation positions that the lawyer asserts or the 
objectives that the lawyer seeks on behalf of the client. It is a duty 
directed more toward means than ends. Reasonable behavior includes 
acting with respect to the court and civility to the opposing side.  
Another duty to the court is one of truth, as to both law and fact. 
This duty usually turns on subjective knowledge and requires a 
lawyer not to knowingly misstate law or fact in civil pleadings and 
other filings. It extends to evidence, barring a civil lawyer from 
knowingly offering any form of false evidence, including testimony of 
witnesses and sometimes the client. The truth duty also may require a 
lawyer to affirmatively remedy any falsehoods of which the lawyer 
later gains knowledge.  
A third court duty is objective merit, which, like truth, extends to 
both law and fact. This standard looks to the objective reasonableness 
of the position, apart from its literal truth. A knowingly false claim 
 
10. I use the phrasing “duty to court,” in lieu of “officer of court,” because 
duty to court encompasses the duties that may attach to a lawyer, 
regardless of any formal relationship with the court. See Eugene R. 
Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39, 39 
(1989) (criticizing the term “officer of court”). 
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cannot have objective merit, but a position can lack objective merit 
even if it does not include known falsehoods. Likewise, in contrast to 
reasonable behavior, the focus of this duty is the merit of the legal 
and factual positions that the lawyer asserts on behalf of the client, 
not the tactics.  
A fourth duty that might arise in civil litigation is one of proper 
motive. This duty might extend to the motives of both client and 
lawyer or it might be limited to either the client or the lawyer. It is a 
duty distinct from truth or objective merit. Under some versions of 
this duty as applied to civil pleadings, a lawyer cannot present even a 
truthful and colorable claim or defense if his or the client’s motive is 
improper. More typically, a motive duty applies to civil papers after 
the initial pleadings, and it therefore overlaps with the duty of 
reasonable behavior, in that an improperly motivated tactic is not 
reasonable. Yet a duty of proper motive has distinct application. The 
duty of reasonable behavior looks more at effect than motive. An 
evidentiary objection in a civil trial, for example, might be reasonably 
stated and presented but improperly motivated, or it might be 
properly motivated but unreasonably disruptive.  
A final duty that a civil litigator may owe to the court is one of 
just cause. This duty is difficult to define. It arguably encompasses all 
of the foregoing duties to the court. In other words, a cause (or tactic) 
is not just if it is not reasonable, honest, objectively meritorious, and 
properly motivated. Yet the concept of just cause may mean more. 
For example, a cause might be unjust—from a social, religious, or 
moral perspective—even if it has objective merit and does not involve 
falsehoods. I do not attempt here to define the proper criterion for 
just cause because that issue is a principal question in the history and 
development of litigation advocacy ethics.  
The lawyer’s court duties all tend to limit the lawyer’s client 
duties, particularly zealous advocacy, in different degrees. If a lawyer 
has a duty to independently assess the justness of a client’s cause from 
the lawyer’s own sense of moral justice, that duty impedes the lawyer’s 
ability to zealously advocate the client’s cause. If the lawyer is bound 
by only a duty of objective merit, rather than moral justice, the lawyer 
has greater leeway for advocacy. If the lawyer is bound only by a duty 
of technical truth or reasonable tactics, the lawyer has even more 
leeway. A duty of proper motive puts a slightly different limit on the 
lawyer’s zealous advocacy. All of these duties act as a limit on zealous 
advocacy, and, at one time or another, formal regulatory standards 
have used each of these court duties to limit advocacy.  
II. Early Litigation Ethics Standards in Europe 
Regulatory standards for lawyers began with the profession itself. 
Some isolated accounts report that ancient advocates took oaths of 
truth and reasonable behavior. The historical record becomes fuller in 
the thirteenth century in England and France. The early English and 
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French standards, usually stated in the form of a litigation oath (in 
essence, “a condensed code of legal ethics”),11 reflected a reasonably 
sophisticated array of litigation duties. These standards in turn 
significantly influenced the development of litigation ethics standards 
in the United States. Some of the English standards came to America 
with the English colonists,12 and the French standards became law in 
the nineteenth century as many states adopted the Field Code.13  
Only a few of the early litigation standards spoke directly of 
duties to the client. This lack of attention to client concerns may 
reflect society’s conception that clients did not merit or need 
protection, but the focus on court, rather than client, also may be 
because the primary source of the standards was the litigation oath, 
mandated and administered by the courts. For whatever reason, in 
the formal regulatory standards, duties to the court were far more 
prominent and complex than duties to the client.  
The early European standards most commonly demanded truth 
and reasonable behavior, but some, particularly those in France, also 
required the lawyer to assess whether the client’s cause was just. The 
precise meaning of this just-cause standard is not known. In most 
oaths, the just-cause standard suggested something more than mere 
truth. In some oaths, the term might have connoted objective merit, 
but often the phrase suggested a broader sense of justness.  
A. Ancient Litigation Oaths  
Oaths performed many functions in ancient society. 14  Office 
holders and professionals took oaths to promise proper future conduct, 
such as in the Greek physicians’ Hippocratic oath.15 Ancient citizens 
also took oaths to swear to the truth of matters, particularly in the 
ancient forms of litigation. The early legal professionals, who assisted 
in litigation, almost certainly took both forms of oaths.  
 
11. This description was coined by Josiah Henry Benton in his seminal 1909 
work on lawyer oaths. Josiah Henry Benton, The Lawyer’s 
Official Oath and Office 9 (1909).  
12. See infra Part III.A (discussing early American regulation). 
13. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Field Code). 
14. See generally Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath, supra note 8, at 7–10 (discussing 
ancient origins of oath and the oath’s different functions in ancient 
society). 
15. Most versions of the Hippocratic oath state duties of the physician to do 
no harm and maintain confidentiality. See, e.g., Charles J. 
McFadden, Medical Ethics 462 (6th ed. 1967) (“I will enter to help 
the sick, and I will abstain from all intentional wrongdoing and harm, 
especially from abusing the bodies of man or woman . . . . And 
whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession . . . I will 
never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.”). 
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Some historical accounts report that early Roman advocates 
swore “to avoid artifice and circumlocution,”16 to “only speak that 
which he believed to be true,” not use “injurious language or 
malicious declamations against his adversary,” and not “to employ 
any trick to prolong the cause.”17 Likewise, ancient Greek advocates 
reportedly swore to “represent the bare truth, without any preface or 
epilogue, without any ornament or figure of rhetoric, or insinuating 
means to win the favor or move the affection of the judges.”18 These 
oaths stated duties of reasonable behavior and truth that the 
advocate owed to the system, rather than client. The primacy of these 
two duties continues today. 
An oath reportedly used in the Justinian era suggests further 
development of the ancient advocate’s oath. The Justinian Code, 
written in the sixth century (AD), purported to codify previous 
Roman law, and the Justinian oath therefore might provide some 
insight to older oath practice.19 The Justinian oath, translated from 
Latin, is as follows:  
[T]hey will undertake with all their power and strength, to carry 
out for their clients what they consider to be just and true, 
doing everything which it is possible for them to do. However, 
they, with their knowledge and skill, shall not prosecute a 
lawsuit with a bad conscience when they know that the case 
entrusted to them is dishonest or utterly hopeless or composed 
of false allegations. But even if, while the suit is proceeding, it 
were to become known that it is of that sort, let them withdraw 
from the case, utterly separating themselves from any such 
common cause.20  
This litigation oath stated duties to both client and court. First, 
it stated a fairly recognizable duty of zealous advocacy that went 
beyond mere competence and loyalty. Lawyers had to swear to “use 
 
16. Benton, supra note 11, at 19 (“In Rome when the advocatus was called 
upon by the Praetor to aid a client in a cause, he was solemnly exhorted 
‘to avoid artifice and circumlocution.’”). 
17. Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 19 Wkly. L. Bull. & Ohio L.J. 47, 49 
(1888) (quoting a Roman oath). 
18. Id. (quoting a Greek oath). 
19. For a concise summary of the Justinian Code, see O.F. Robinson et 
al., European Legal History 2–3 (3d ed. 2000). The Justinian Code, 
or Codex, is one of the four parts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, which is 
sometimes confusingly referred to in its entirety as the Code of 
Justinian or—even more confusingly—Justinian’s Code. Id. The other 
three parts are the Digest, the Institutes, and the Novels. Id. 
20. Justinian Code lib. 3, tit. 1, l. 14 (Paul Krueger ed., Berlin, 
Weidmann 1877) (ca. 534) (excerpted portion is translated by the 
author from original Latin). 
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all their power and strength” to do “everything possible” on behalf of 
their clients. Yet the duty was limited. The next sentence of the oath 
expressly conditioned the zeal command with a “however” clause that 
prioritized truth. Lawyers had to ensure that their causes were “true,” 
not “dishonest” and not “composed of false allegations.” Moreover, if 
the lawyers later learned that a case was dishonest, they had to 
withdraw and “utterly separate themselves” from the case.  
Importantly, this oath apparently imposed a just-cause duty. It 
required a lawyer to not proceed with a “bad conscience,” to consider 
whether the case was “just and true” and whether it was “utterly 
hopeless.” It is possible that the terms were simply synonyms for truth, 
in that a case was just if true, a case was utterly hopeless if not true, 
and a lawyer could not have a good conscience if he made false 
statements. Yet the juxtaposition of these terms suggests a duty that 
went beyond truth. These terms also could have connoted objective 
merit. A case that lacked objective merit could have been described as 
utterly hopeless or unjust. Lawyers and courts of the era may have 
understood this duty and its limits, or perhaps they debated the proper 
meaning and practical application of their litigation duties, as lawyers 
do today. In any event, the Justinian oath unquestionably put limits on 
advocacy, and those limits likely went beyond mere truth. 
 B. Early English Litigation Conduct Standards  
The legal profession faded in Europe during the “dark ages.”21 By 
the early thirteenth century, lawyers began to reemerge in England,22 
and when lawyers returned, so did their regulation. The regulation in 
the early period is most evident in the records of the ecclesiastical 
courts of England, but English lay courts also regulated litigation 
conduct. The emphasis of this regulation was truth, but the 
regulation also varyingly imposed duties of reasonable behavior, 
proper motive, objective merit, and just cause.  
1. The Litigation Oaths of English Ecclesiastical Courts 
In England, in 1237, the council in St. Paul’s, London, decreed a 
litigation oath for ecclesiastical advocates. This decree primarily 
required litigation honesty: “Let all advocates beware that they do 
not themselves, or by means of others, suborn witnesses, or instruct 
 
21. See Herman Cohen, A History of the English Bar and 
Attornatus to 1450, at 1–19 (1929) (reviewing the possible role of 
lawyers in the Anglo-Saxon period and noting the “darkness” of the age).  
22. See generally Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal 
Profession 14–49 (1992) (addressing emerging legal profession in 
England). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy 
391 
the parties to give false evidence, or to suppress the truth.”23 The 
advocate also swore that he would “plead faithfully, not to delay 
justice or to deprive the other party of it; but to defend his client 
both according to law and reason.”24 The delay phrase reflected a 
reasonableness duty. The last portion—defense of the client according 
to “law and reason”—may have reflected a client-oriented competence 
duty, but its context suggests a duty to the court. The preceding 
clause—the requirement that the lawyer not “deprive the other party” 
of “justice”—unquestionably stated a duty to the court that might 
include a just-cause duty. Indeed, Professor Brand characterized this 
as requiring advocates to not prevent opponents “from getting justice 
if they had right on their side.”25  
Professor Brand reported that in 1273, Archbishop Kilwardby 
imposed upon advocates practicing in the Court of Arches in London 
a “much fuller” oath that consisted of five clauses.26 The first clause, 
according to Professor Brand, stated duties to the client—“faithful 
and diligent service to their clients.” 27  This suggests duties of 
competence, loyalty, and perhaps zealous advocacy. A second clause 
reportedly stated an explicit just-cause duty: advocates reportedly 
swore “not to knowingly accept unjust causes and to relinguish [sic] 
such causes if they only discovered this after they had agreed to 
act.”28 The third clause stated a duty of reasonable behavior and 
tactics: not to seek unjust delays or unnecessarily protract litigation.29 
A fourth clause, unique in English precedent according to Professor 
Brand, required advocates to not knowingly infringe upon 
ecclesiastical liberties.30 In the last clause, advocates swore to a client 
duty regarding fees.31 Thus, although this oath had some regard for 
the client, duties to the court, including truth, reasonable behavior, 
and just cause, were paramount. 
In 1295, the Archbishop of Canterbury imposed an oath that 
emphasized the lawyer’s duty to conduct a prefiling inquiry. Under 
this oath, lawyers swore  
 
23. Benton, supra note 11, at 15 (quoting 1 Matthew Paris, English 
History 92 (J.A. Giles trans., London, Henry G. Bohn 1852) (ca. 
1257)). 
24. Id. 
25. Brand, supra note 22, at 146. 
26. Id. at 147 (citing 2 Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae 27 
(David Wilkins ed., Culture et Civilisation 1964) (1737)).  
27. Id. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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that they will bring no case to trial, unless they believe it to be 
true and honest, upon the information on the part of their 
clients; that, in receiving informations from their clients, they 
will elicit from them, with all possible caution, the truth of the 
case, and they will clearly show their clients the dangers to 
which they expose themselves in legal proceedings as far as they 
know, declining to prosecute any further desperate, bad cases; 
and as soon as the cases or surrounding conditions show 
themselves to be unjust (dishonest) from the point of view of 
the law, they shall relinquish them entirely.32 
A duty of pre-filing inquiry can help the client, but the phrasing of 
this duty suggests it primarily served the court, rather than client. 
The lawyer had to use “all possible caution” when talking to the 
client to elicit “the truth of the case” and counsel the client as to “the 
dangers to which they expose themselves in legal proceedings.”33  
This 1295 oath referred to a duty of both truth and just cause, 
but the just-cause duty may have been narrow. One translator of the 
oath—Josiah Benton in 1909—included a parenthetical stating 
“dishonest” after the word “unjust,” which may or may not have 
reflected the original understanding of the term in 1295.34 Moreover, 
this oath expressly linked its just-cause duty to objective merit: the 
lawyer had to withdraw when the case showed itself as unjust “from 
the point of view of the law.”35  
Although this record of English ecclesiastical oaths is not full, it 
suggests some important elements of the litigation standards for 
lawyers practicing in those courts. First, the client was not the 
primary concern. Only fleeting reference is given to client protection. 
Second, duties to the court expressly overrode any client concerns. 
The lawyer at times had to refrain from taking actions that might 
benefit his client, including withdrawing altogether. Third, the 
emphasis was truth, with suggestions of just cause, objective merit, 
and reasonable behavior.  
2. The Litigation Standards of the Early English Lay Courts 
The English Parliament soon followed with regulation of lawyers 
practicing in the King’s courts. In 1275, the first Statute of 
 
32. Benton, supra note 11, at 23–24 (translating 24 Giovanni Domenico 
Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova, et Amplissima Collectio 
col. 1149 (Huberto Welter ed., 1901) (1780) [hereinafter Sacrorum 
Conciliorum]). 
33. Id. at 23 (translating 24 Sacrorum Conciliorum, supra note 32, col. 
1149). 
34. Id. at 24 (translating 24 Sacrorum Conciliorum, supra note 32, col. 
1149). 
35. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy 
393 
Westminster set forth a variety of legal reforms, aimed primarily at 
regulating “serjeants,” also known as “countors” (early predecessors to 
modern barristers).36 A few sections dealt with specific issues, such as 
champerty and court delays. Chapter 29, entitled “Deceits by Pleaders,” 
more broadly regulated the conduct of lawyers: 
That if any Serjeant, Pleader, or other, do any manner of Deceit 
or Collusion in the King’s Court, or consent [unto it,] in deceit 
of the Court, [or] to beguile the Court, or the Party, and thereof 
be attainted, he shall be imprisoned for a Year and a Day, and 
from thenceforth shall not be heard to plead in [that] Court for 
any Man . . . .37 
This statute’s use of the term “deceit” obviously imposed a duty 
of truth, but, according to Professors Brand and Rose, English courts 
applied this provision to develop “detailed norms” of conduct, which 
included not only duties to the court but also to the client.38  
According to Professor Brand, courts used the statute to impose 
prohibitions against not only “knowingly misleading the court” (a 
truth duty), but also against “persisting with lines of argument which 
the court had told them were unacceptable or wasting the time of the 
court” (a reasonable behavior duty).39 On the client side, Professor 
Rose reported that courts developed the concept of “ambidexterity,” 
to connote a loyalty duty similar to modern notions of conflicts of 
interest.40 Ambidexterity in turn included the concept of confidentiality.41 
 
36. See Andrews, Evolution, supra note 8, at 1390–92 (discussing the 
different categories of early English lawyers). 
37. The Statutes of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw., c. 29, reprinted in 1 
Statutes of the Realm 34 (1810) (alteration in original). 
38. Brand, supra note 22, at 127, 135; Jonathan Rose, The Legal 
Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 Syracuse 
L. Rev. 1, 57 n.253 (1998) (“The intended beneficiaries of the 
prohibition would include the court, the miscreant lawyer’s client, and 
the opposing party and its attorney.”). 
39. Brand, supra note 22, at 127.  
40. See generally Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict of 
Interest and the Medieval and Early Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. Chi. 
L. Sch. Roundtable 137, 138 (2000) (comparing medieval conflict of 
interest, commonly known as “ambidexterity,” to modern conflict of 
interest). 
41. According to Professor Rose, most cases of ambidexterity involved 
switching sides, but some involved revealing a client’s information. Id. 
at 195. 
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This confidentiality principle, although indirectly stated, is one of the 
earliest formal English recognitions of a client confidentiality duty.42  
A 1280 London ordinance supplemented the Statute of 
Westminster, by setting standards of litigation conduct for lawyers 
who practiced in the courts of London.43 The ordinance complained of 
“ignorance” and of “foolish” pleaders who created a “scandal of the 
Courts,”44 and focused primarily on reasonable behavior and tactics. 
The ordinance, for example, required lawyers “to plead and . . . make 
proffers (profres) at the bar (la bare) without baseness (vileinie) and 
without reproach and foul (lede) words and without slandering 
(mesdire : reviling?) any man.”45  
Some informal sources, in the nature of academic discourse, more 
broadly outlined the lawyer’s litigation duties. One early example is 
the Mirroir Des Justice or Mirror of Justices, which is believed to 
have been written about 1285.46 Scholars disagree about the nature of 
this work, some calling it a treatise and others calling it a critique or 
parody of lawyers.47 In any event, it provided a glimpse into litigation 
standards of the era. It reported a serjeant’s oath that stated a 
primary duty of honesty owed to the court: he “will not knowingly 
maintain or defend wrong or falsehood, but will abandon his client 
immediately that he perceives his wrongdoing.”48  
The Mirror of Justices also listed other litigation duties: 
[H]e will never have recourse to false delays or false witnesses, 
and never allege, proffer, or consent to any corruption, deceit, 
lie, or falsified law, but loyally will maintain the right of his 
client, so that he may not fail through his folly, or negligence, 
nor by default of him, nor by default of any argument that he 
could urge; and that he will not by blow, contumely, brawl, 
threat, noise, or villain conduct disturb any judge, party, 
 
42. See Andrews, Evolution, supra note 8, at 1395, 1405–06 (discussing 
emergence of confidentiality principle and attorney-client privilege in 
England). 
43. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 231–34 (translating Liber Custumarum, 
f. 205 b (Henry Thomas Riley ed., London, Longman, Green, Longman 
& Roberts 1860) (ca. 1300–1350)). 
44. Id. at 231. 
45. Id. 
46. Frederic William Maitland, Introduction to The Mirror of Justices, 
at xxiv (William Joseph Whittaker ed., London, Bernard Quaritch 
1895) (ca. 1285). 
47. The introduction to the Selden Society edition discusses these issues in 
detail. Id. at xviii–xlviii. 
48. The Mirror of Justices, supra note 46, at 48. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy 
395 
serjeant, or other in court, nor impede the hearing or the course 
of justice.49 
This listing included duties to the client, including competence 
(“folly or negligence”) and zealous advocacy (“default of any 
argument that he could urge”). Its duties to the court included truth 
(“false delays or witnesses,” “deceit, lie or falsified law”), reasonable 
behavior (“blow, contumely, brawl,” contemptuous rudeness) and just 
cause (“the course of justice”).  
The bar and inns also informed lawyers of their ethical duties. In 
1648, Lord Commissioner Whitelocke lectured new serjeants regarding 
their three “general” duties—“Secrecy, Diligence, and Fidelity.”50 This 
list of general duties reflected a greater concern for client than the 
formal standards of this and preceding eras. This concern might be 
attributable to the nature of Lord Whitelocke’s speech—inspirational 
training of new serjeants—but it also could have reflected an 
increasing awareness of client concerns. These duties included the full 
litany of client duties—competence (“diligence”), loyalty (“fidelity”), 
and confidentiality (“secrecy”)—and together they hinted at zealous 
advocacy. Indeed, Lord Whitelocke used the word “zeal,” one of the 
earliest express references to “zeal” in advocacy in reported ethical 
statements.51 But Lord Whitelocke made this reference in the context 
of limiting the advocate’s zeal: “An Advocate owes to the Court a just 
and true Information, the zeal of his Clients Cause, as it must not 
transport him to Irreverence, so it must not mislead him to untruths 
in his Information of the Court.”52 Thus, despite recognition of zeal on 
behalf of clients, the serjeant had greater duties to the court. These 
higher duties included duties of truth and just causes (a “just and 
true Information”) and a duty of reasonable behavior (owing “great 
Respect and Reverence” to the court).  
The other branch of the early English bar—attorneys 
(predecessors to modern solicitors)—had similar ethical duties. The 
best-known source of legal ethics standards for early attorneys is the 
following “do no falsehood” litigation oath: 
You shall doe noe Falshood, nor consent to anie to be done in 
the Office of Pleas of this Courte wherein you are admitted an 
Attorney And if you shall know of anie to be done you shall 
give Knowledge thereof to the Lord Chiefe Baron or other his 
 
49. Id.  
50. Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials 352, 354 (London, J. Tonson 
1732) (1682) (“The new Sergeants appeared at the Chancery Bar, and I 
made the Speech to them . . . .”). 
51. Id. 
52. Id.  
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Brethren that it may be reformed you shall Delay noe Man for 
Lucre Gaine or Malice you shall increase noe Fee but you shall 
be contented with the old Fee accustomed And further you shall 
use your selfe in the Office of Attorney in the said office of Pleas 
in this Courte according to your best Learninge and Discrecion. 
So helpe you God.53 
English attorneys took a form of this oath for centuries, starting 
perhaps as early as the thirteenth century.54 The language varied,  but 
the English attorney’s “do no falsehood” oath typically included a 
competence duty—“best learning and discretion”—which phrasing 
also hinted at zealous advocacy. Yet the oath prominently stated a 
specific duty of truth (a prohibition against false evidence and claims) 
and a combined duty of reasonable behavior and proper motive (to 
not delay litigation for “gain” or “malice”). These duties expressly 
overrode the attorney’s duty to his client: the oath required an 
attorney to report falsehoods to the court. This oath in its original 
form did not include either a just-cause duty or a duty of objective 
merit.  
This overall history of litigation standards in England, from the 
Middle Ages until the colonial period, shows a relatively detailed set 
of ethical standards for lawyers in litigation. These standards usually 
emphasized the primary duties to the court, rather than the client. 
The duties to the court were typically truth and reasonable behavior. 
Objective merit and proper motive also were suggested. Only a very 
few English statements, primarily the early ecclesiastical oaths, urged 
a distinct duty of just cause.  
C. French (and later Swiss) Litigation Oaths 
The early history of litigation standards in France paralleled that of 
England. Litigation oaths were the primary source of ethical standards, 
and the French oaths reflected the same concerns as the English 
standards. They included some duties to client, but the emphasis was 
duties to the court. In comparison to the English standards, the French 
oaths more prominently stated a just-cause duty.  
Two French ecclesiastical oaths, both dictated in 1231, stated 
relatively sophisticated litigation duties. One required that 
 
53. Benton, supra note 11, at 28; Select Committee Appointed to 
Inquire into the State of the Public Records of the Kingdom, 
First Report on Public Records 234 (London, Luke Hansard & 
Sons 1800). 
54. Benton reported that the “do no falsehood” oath was used from a “very 
early period, perhaps as early as the year 1246,” and that the oath was 
“doubtless framed and in use certainly from the time of the Act of Henry 
IV. in 1402.” Benton, supra note 11, at 28.  
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[e]very single advocate shall swear that he will faithfully perform 
his duties; that he will not support cases that are unjust or 
militate against his conscience; that he will not abstract 
(embezzle) documents of his party (client) nor cause such to be 
abstracted; that he will not, to his knowledge, use false pleas, or 
such as have been malitiously excogitated; that he will not bring 
it about that falsehoods and surreptions be made, or that false 
documents be produced in his case; nor that he will prolong 
(delay) the case of his client as long as he believes that he is 
acting in the interest of the client himself; and that in those 
matters which shall be transacted in court and concerning which 
requirements are made of him by the Judges, he will not silence 
the truth according to his belief; and that if he become convinced 
of being inadequate to the handling of the case, he will have 
conference with the procurators; and that he will prepare with his 
own hand a journal and the acts in cases which he has taken, as 
faithfully as possible; or that he will cause them to be written 
out, in case he be neither able nor willing to do so himself.55 
The other, “Oath of the Advocates,” provided 
[t]hat they shall not favor (take) knowingly cases that are not 
just; nor shall they bring about, with malice aforethought, 
undue delay or haste in the conduct of cases by means of false 
oath, rather than stand by the truth. Nor shall they instruct 
their client toward malitious answer or statement; nor shall they 
after the published attestations, or at any stage of the trial, nor 
even before the oath suborn witnesses, or cause them to be 
suborned. Nor shall they permit their client to produce false 
witnesses; and if they should gain knowledge thereof, they shall 
reveal such to the court. If memorials (briefs) are to be made 
they shall do so in good faith, and not withdraw from court 
malitiously, until the memorial be completed and admitted in 
court. Clients they shall expedite to the best of their ability, 
and in good faith. Nor shall they bother (literally burden) the 
Judge with objections, believing that they will give in to them. 
They shall sustain the honor of the court, nor perpetrate in 
court a falsehood.56  
These 1231 oaths stated duties to both client and court. The client 
duties included forms of competence (“inadequate . . . handling” of 
cases), loyalty (not “embezzle” client documents) and zealous advocacy 
(“expedite to the best of their ability”). The duties to the court were 
 
55. Benton, supra note 11, at 21 (translating 23 Sacrorum Conciliorum, 
supra note 32, cols. 218–19).  
56. Id. at 21–22 (translating 23 Sacrorum Conciliorum, supra note 32, 
cols. 240–41). 
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more plentiful. They enumerated multiple aspects of the truth duty: to 
not use false pleas, to not offer false documents, to not suborn 
perjury, and to maintain the honor of the court by not perpetrating 
falsehoods. They stated duties of reasonable behavior and proper 
motive, including to not burden judges with undue objections and to 
not use malicious pleas. Both oaths also stated duties to not bring 
unjust cases (“unjust or militate against his conscience” and “not 
just”). The several duties to the court were paramount and required 
affirmative reporting to the court: a lawyer must not “permit [a] 
client to produce false witnesses” and if he learns later of false 
evidence, he “[should] reveal such to the court.”  
In 1278, an ecclesiastical oath added a more explicit statement of 
zealous advocacy. It required lawyers to give “their clients as faithful 
defense as is in their power.”57 Once again, this duty was joined with 
the duty “to not favor cases that are unjust.”58  
In 1274, King Phillip III enacted an ordinance that regulated 
lawyers in the general courts. His stated purpose was to give his 
subjects the “lawful right in cases at law” and “to deter those who 
. . . offer their professional services, from maliciously protracting legal 
contests or charging immoderate fees.” 59  The principal mode of 
regulation was an oath, by which the lawyer swore every year to 
abide by duties owed to both the client and the court: 
That in all cases which are being tried in said courts before 
which they have practiced in the past or shall practice, they will 
perform their duties bonâ fidê diligently and faithfully as long as 
they have reason to believe their case to be just. They shall not 
bring any case into said courts either as defending or counseling 
lawyers unless they shall have believed it to be just; and, if at 
any stage of the trial the case appears to them unjust, or even 
intrinsically bad, they shall discontinue to further defend it, 
withdrawing from said case entirely as defending or counseling 
lawyers.60  
The duty owed to the client (“[to] diligently and faithfully [act]”) 
suggested competence, loyalty, and zealous advocacy, but it was ex-
pressly subordinate to a duty to the court (“as long as they have reason 
to believe their case to be just”). The priority of duties to the court also 
 
57. Id. at 23 (translating 24 Sacrorum Conciliorum, supra note 32, col. 
216). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 16 (translating 2 Recueil Général des Anciennes Lois 
Françaises no. 247 (François-André Isambert et al. eds., Belin-Le-
Prieur ca. 1821–1833) [hereinafter Recueil Général]). 
60. Benton, supra note 11, at 16–17 (translating 2 Recueil Général, 
supra note 59, no. 247). 
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was reflected by the duty to withdraw from a case if the lawyer came to 
believe that a cause was unjust or “even intrinsically bad.” By 
distinguishing between these two standards, this oath’s withdrawal duty 
suggested both a just-cause and an objective-merit standard.  
Over the next several centuries, French ordinances supplemented 
the 1274 oath with additional duties to court and client. In 1344, the 
oath included prohibitions against “false citations” and postponements 
“by subterfuge.”61 In 1536, the oath added provisions against conflicts 
of interest62 and a confidentiality duty.63 
Importantly for the development of legal ethics standards in the 
United States, the medieval French litigation oaths became the basis 
for an oath imposed by the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, in 1816.64 
A few decades later, this Swiss oath in turn became the basis for a 
common set of statutory duties in the United States, embodied in the 
Field Code.65 The 1816 Swiss oath required the lawyer to swear as 
follows:  
 
61. Benton reported the 1344 oath ordinance as follows:  
Those advocates who are retained shall not be allowed to 
continue their practice unless they bind themselves by oath to 
the following effect: to fulfil their duties with fidelity and 
exactitude; not to take charge of any causes which they know to 
be unjust; that they will abstain from false citations; that they 
will not seek to procure a postponement of their causes by 
subterfuge, or malicious pretexts; that whatever may be the 
importance of a cause, they will not receive more than thirty 
livres for their fee, or any other kind of gratuity over and above 
that sum, with liberty, however, to take less; that they will 
lower their fees according to the importance of the cause and the 
circumstances of the parties; and that they will make no treaty 
or arrangement with their clients depending on the event of the 
trial. 
Id. at 14 (quoting Robert Jones, A History of the French Bar, 
Ancient and Modern 102–03 (Phila., T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., Law 
Booksellers and Publishers, 1856); see Edward S. Cox-Sinclair, The Bar 
in the United States, 33 Law Mag. & Rev. Quart. Rev. 
Jurisprudence (5th ser.) 164, 193 (1908) (reporting in French that the 
1344 ordinance added: “They will not speak injurious words against 
adverse parties or others.”). 
62. Benton, supra note 11, at 18 (“[A]dvocates must not give advice to 
both parties under punishment of being heavily fined by financial 
penalties, suspension or loss of all their property.”) (translating 12 
Recueil Général, supra note 59, no. 235). 
63. Cox-Sinclair, supra note 61, at 193 (in French). 
64. Raymound Perrot, Le serment de l’avocat et les us et 
coutume du Barreau de Genève 14–15 (2d ed. 1980) (tracing 
history of Swiss lawyer regulations and oaths). 
65. I discuss the Field Code duties of lawyers in Part III.C.  
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1. I swear, before God, to be faithful to the Republic and the 
Canton of Geneva.  
2. To never act without the respect due to the Tribunal and 
the Authority.  
3. To not counsel or maintain any cause that I do not feel is 
just or equitable, as long as it does not refer to a criminal 
defense.  
4. To not knowingly use any means outside of the truth, in 
order to maintain the causes brought before me, and to never 
trick Judges by any means, nor by any false presentation of 
facts and laws.  
5. To absolve myself from any offensive personality, and to not 
advance any fact contrary to the honor and the reputation of 
the parties, unless it is a necessary for the advancement of 
our cause.  
6. To not encourage or commence any lawsuit because of any 
personal interest.  
7. To never refuse counsel based on personal considerations, 
causes of feeble, foreigners, or oppressed.  
8. May God punish me if I break these rules.66  
The Swiss oath only hinted at client concerns, in the sixth and 
seventh clauses. These clauses to some degree reflected loyalty in that 
they barred a lawyer from bringing suits for “any personal interest” 
and from declining cases for “personal considerations.” Both of these 
also reflected other concerns. The sixth clause arguably sought also to 
protect the other party from suits motivated by the lawyer’s personal 
interests. The seventh clause reflected the societal concern of 
availability of legal services.  
The remainder of the Swiss oath focused on the court. It stated 
multiple duties of reasonable behavior. The second clause demanded 
respect to the court. The fifth clause required the lawyer to refrain 
from offensive personality. Interestingly, the fifth clause conditioned a 
reasonableness duty. It first stated a duty to not use facts to 
undermine the honor and reputation of the parties, but it concluded 
with a caveat, “unless . . . necessary for the advancement of [the] 
cause.” This is a rare example of a client-oriented duty qualifying a 
court duty.  
 
66. 1 Revue étrangère de législation et d’économie politique 734–
35 (Paris, Gustave Pissin 1834) (translated from the original French). 
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The fourth clause stated an extensive truth duty. It barred false 
and misleading “means,” providing that a lawyer may not use “means 
outside of the truth” to maintain causes and may never “trick Judges 
by any means.” It also barred “false presentation of facts and laws.”  
Finally, the third clause of the Swiss oath stated a just-cause 
duty. In a distinction that soon would prove important to 
development of American legal ethics standards, the Swiss oath 
exempted criminal defense from the just-cause duty. Yet it did not 
exempt criminal defense lawyers from the other court duties of the 
second, fourth, and fifth clauses. Thus, the just-cause duty was 
distinct from and in addition to the reasonable behavior and truth 
duties. 
In sum, the early French standards roughly paralleled the English 
standards, with the formal standards in France more prominently 
stating the just-cause duty. Truth and reasonable behavior were 
paramount duties from the very beginning of the profession in both 
cultures. The other court duties—objective merit and proper motive—
appeared with less frequency. Client concerns were often unstated, 
and when stated, the client duties, including zealous advocacy, were 
expressly subordinate to the lawyer’s duties to the court.  
III. Litigation Ethics Standards in the United States 
Through the Nineteenth Century 
In America, the colonies and early states minimally regulated 
legal ethics, and to the extent that the regulation followed a European 
model, it used the English standards. The early regulation typically 
imposed only truth and reasonableness duties. In the early and mid-
nineteenth century, academics began to discuss more broadly proper 
litigation advocacy, and, in doing so, they identified areas of 
uncertainty, particularly with regard to the proper limits on advocacy 
beyond truth and reasonable behavior. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, states began to set regulatory standards of 
litigation conduct. The new regulation began with the Field Code, 
which brought the 1816 Swiss oath, including its just-cause standard, 
to the United States. Bar associations soon followed with new codes of 
legal ethics that experimented with other litigation standards.  
A. American Litigation Standards Before the Nineteenth Century 
Regulation of lawyers and their conduct was sporadic in early 
America. Many colonies used the English “do no falsehood” oath.67 
 
67. See Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 26 (1966) 
(“[I]n the reign of Henry IV . . . a form of oath was framed, on which 
most forms of oaths prescribed later in the American colonies were 
founded.”); see generally Andrews, Evolution, supra note 8, at 1415–16 
(discussing colonial oaths and the “do no falsehood” oath particularly). 
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Some colonies had unique litigation oaths. A 1705 Rhode Island law, 
for example, mandated an oath that imposed a form of objective 
merit standard: “not to Plead for favour nor affection for any Person, 
but ye meritt of the Case according to Law.”68 During and after the 
revolution, many, but not all, colonies and early states moved to a 
simple oath that required lawyers only to swear allegiance and to 
promise to truly and honestly demean themselves.69  
A few procedural statutes and court rules addressed lawyer 
behavior in litigation. In Maryland in 1682, the Upper House of the 
Assembly imposed a reasonable-behavior duty on lawyers arguing an 
appeal before them by ordering the lawyers to “speak distinctly to one 
Error first before they proceed to the next without Disturbing each 
other.”70 In 1813, the new federal Congress passed the “vexatious 
lawyer” statute, which imposed a duty that reflected both reasonable 
behavior and proper motive: a lawyer could not “multipl[y] the 
proceedings . . . so as to increase costs unreasonably and 
vexatiously.”71 In 1842, the first set of codified federal equity rules 
required that a lawyer attest that there was “good ground for the 
suit,” an objective merit standard.72  
Most legal ethics guidance in this early era in the United States 
likely came through informal sources, such as speeches and office 
training. The record of the content of such discourse in this era is 
thin. One example is a work by Cotton Mather in 1710. 73  He 
instructed each lawyer to behave reasonably: “keep constantly a 
Court of Chancery in your own Breast” and “abominate the use of all 
unfair Arts to Confound Evidence, to Browbeat Testimonies, to 
Suppress what may give Light in the Case.”74 He similarly urged 
lawyers to think of their broader reputation and duty to society and 
to refute the “old Complaint, That a Good Lawyer seldom is a Good 
 
68. Benton, supra note 11, at 94–95 (quoting An Act Requireing All 
Provissions To Be Pact & Packers Marke Sett on Before 
Shipped of to Any of Ye Plantations (1705), reprinted in Laws 
and Acts of Her Majesties Colony of Rhode Island, and 
Providence Plantations From its First Settlement 1636–1705, 
f. 114–116 (Providence, Sidney S. Rider & Burnett Rider, 1896) (1705)).  
69. See generally Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath, supra note 8, at 22–23. 
70. Journal of the Upper House of Assembly 1659–1701 f. 456, 
reprinted in 7 Archives of Maryland 361 (1889).  
71. Act of July 22, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 21 (1813). This was the predecessor to 
current § 1927 “Counsel’s liability for excessive costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
(2006).  
72. R. Prac. Cts. Equity 24, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli, xlviii (1842). 
73. Cotton Mather, Bonifacius (1710). 
74. Mather, supra note 73, at 161. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy 
403 
Neighbor . . . by making your Skill in the Law a Blessing to your 
Neighborhood.”75  
In sum, the nineteenth century began with few formal dictates as 
to the litigation duties of American lawyers. These few standards 
tended to follow the English model of requiring honest and reasonable 
behavior in litigation. Client duties were rare. Some rules imposed 
objective merit or motive standards, but apparently no formalized 
early American standard imposed an explicit duty of just cause. 
B. Nineteenth-Century Academic Discourse on Litigation Ethics 
The nineteenth century was a transformative century for legal 
ethics in the United States. This transformation began largely with 
academic discussion of legal ethics. Lawyers and academics began to 
flesh out, in unprecedented detail, the broad inherited traditions of 
proper litigation conduct. As lawyers and scholars added detail to the 
broad standards and applied them in specific situations, they revealed 
some uncertainty as to the underlying litigation duties. 
One area of uncertainty was the proper ethical role of criminal 
defense lawyers. American lawyers did not have a broad historical 
basis from which to draw ethical standards for criminal cases. 
Criminal defense had never been the focus of European litigation 
oaths. In England, legal representation in criminal cases was not as 
common as in civil cases. England did not extend a full right of 
criminal defense counsel until the nineteenth century.76 In the United 
States, lawyers and academics discussed whether federal77 and state78 
constitutional guarantees impacted the ethical standards governing 
criminal defense lawyers. This discussion typically compared a 
lawyer’s duties in criminal cases and civil cases, which in turn 
prompted a reevaluation of the civil duties.  
Today, scholars attempt to describe the nineteenth-century 
ethical discourse as falling into a particular model or view of proper 
litigation advocacy.79 In broad strokes, modern scholars have classified 
the nineteenth-century discussion into three broad models of litigation 
 
75. Id. at 163. 
76. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821–27 (1975) (recounting 
history of self-representation and limited right to counsel in England 
before the nineteenth century). 
77. U.S. Const., amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”). 
78. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided 
Coin on Its Edge, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 55, 81 (2003) (surveying 
state constitutional provisions). 
79. See sources cited supra note 3 (containing modern commentary 
discussing nineteenth-century legal ethics).  
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behavior: a client-oriented view, a lawyer morality view, and a middle 
view. Although a spectrum of views may be a more accurate 
description of the nineteenth-century discourse, these three categories 
help identify the issues and the struggle to define the proper limits, if 
any, on litigation advocacy.  
1. The Client-Oriented View 
The nineteenth-century client-oriented view typically is associated 
with English Lord Brougham, who urged that the lawyer knew but 
one person, his client. Lord Brougham made this statement in 1820 in 
his defense of Queen Caroline against criminal adultery charges filed 
by the King. Lord Brougham had learned confidentially that the King 
was a “bigamist and a perjurer,” which might have defeated the 
King’s title to the crown.80 Supporters of the King supposed that Lord 
Brougham would not expose the King, but Lord Brougham’s famous 
statement revealed otherwise: 
[L]et no man vainly suppose, that not only I, but that any, the 
youngest member of the profession would hesitate one moment 
in the fearless discharge of his paramount duty. I once before 
took leave to remind your Lordships—which was unnecessary, 
but there are many whom it may be needful to remind—that an 
advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in 
the discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that 
client and none other. To save that client by all expedient 
means—to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all 
others, and among others to himself—is the highest and most 
unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm— 
the suffering—the torment—the destruction—which he may 
bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a 
patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, 
to the wind, he must go on reckless of the consequences, if his 
fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion 
for his client’s protection!81  
Although given in a narrow context (a high-profile criminal case 
in England) without full explanation, Lord Brougham’s statement 
became a focal point of legal ethics debate in nineteenth-century 
America. The idealized (or more often demonized82) characterization 
 
80. George P. Costigan, Jr., Cases and Other Authorities on 
Legal Ethics 225 (1917).  
81. 1 Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham 63 (1841). 
82. Professor Hoeflich asserts that “[Lord] Brougham’s statements quickly 
became well-known, but they were not quickly approved . . . [and] 
were attacked and viewed by contemporaries and successors as being 
utterly inappropriate.” Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 795; see also Altman, 
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of Lord Brougham’s statement was that the lawyer’s only duty was to 
his client and required full zealous advocacy. This characterization 
may not accurately reflect Lord Brougham’s personal views,83 but he 
nonetheless became the symbol of the client-oriented model of 
litigation. This model at a minimum put the client in greater 
prominence than did other views of the nineteenth century and more 
so than the historical standards from earlier eras. In addition, this 
model almost certainly rejected the just-cause duty, perhaps in all 
litigation but particularly in criminal defense.  
2. The Lawyer Morality View  
The man primarily associated with the lawyer morality view is 
David Hoffman, a professor of law at the University of Maryland. In 
1836, Hoffman, as part of his Course of Legal Studies, stated fifty 
“Resolutions In Regard to Professional Deportment,” which he urged 
each lawyer to regularly repeat.84 His first resolution expressly down-
played zeal: “I will never permit professional zeal to carry me beyond 
the limits of sobriety and decorum.” 85  Several other resolutions 
demanded reasonable behavior86 and truth in litigation.87  
 
supra note 2, at 2443–47 (discussing Lord Brougham and scholarly 
criticism of his position of “absolute loyalty to the client”). 
83. Scholars debate whether Lord Brougham later repudiated his famous 
statement. Compare Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, “Anything 
Rather than a Deliberate and Well-Considered Opinion”—Henry Lord 
Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1221, 1223 
(2006) (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that he 
truly believed or endorsed such a view), with Monroe H. Freedman, 
Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 
1213, 1213 (2006) (arguing that Brougham never repudiated his 
statement and supported it throughout his life). See also Costigan, 
supra note 80, at 226 (reporting on dinner remarks in which Lord 
Brougham supposedly endorsed limitations on advocacy).  
84. Hoffman published a plan for legal education, and to the second edition 
of this work he appended his ethical resolutions, for which he is now 
best known. 2 David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 752–75 
(2d ed., Balt., Joseph Neal 1836) (setting forth “Resolutions In Regard 
to Deportment”). Hoffman’s resolutions are reprinted in Henry S. 
Drinker, Legal Ethics 338–51 (1953) and Report of the Committee 
on Code of Professional Ethics, 31 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 676, 717–35 
(1907) [hereinafter 1907 ABA Report]. 
85. 2 Hoffman, supra note 84, at 752 (Resolution 1). Resolution 1 
continued: “but bear in mind, with Sir Edward Coke, that ‘if a river 
swell beyond its banks, it loseth its own channel.’” Id. 
86. Resolutions 3 and 4 urged respect for the courts even if the judges treat 
the lawyer disrespectfully. Id. Resolution 6 required advocates to be 
“studiously respectful” to “the various officers of the court.” Id. at 753. 
Resolution 42 urged advocates resolve to “never esteem it [the 
advocates’] privilege to disregard [the witnesses’] feelings.” Id. at 770. 
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But Hoffman went beyond merely demanding reasonable and 
truthful litigation conduct. He is most known for his resolution that 
lawyers must use their own conscience, not the wishes of the client, to 
guide them in litigation: 
My client’s conscience, and my own, are distinct entities: and 
though my vocation may sometimes justify my maintaining as 
facts or principles, in doubtful cases, what may be neither one 
nor the other, I shall ever claim the privileges of solely judging 
to what extent to go. In civil cases, if I am satisfied from the 
evidence that the fact is against my client, he must excuse me if 
I do not see as he does, and do not press it: and should the 
principle also be wholly at variance with sound law, it would be 
dishonourable folly in me to endeavour to incorporate it into the 
jurisprudence of the country, when, if successful, it would be a 
gangrene that might bring death to my cause of the succeeding 
day.88 
Although framed in terms of the lawyer’s own conscience, this state-
ment arguably tied the lawyer’s decision to objective merit. Hoffman 
permitted the lawyer to judge facts or principles in “doubtful cases” 
that could go either way.89 He likewise condemned as “gangrene” and 
“dishonorable folly” legal arguments that were “wholly at variance 
with sound law.”90  
Elsewhere, however, Hoffman suggested a distinct just-cause 
standard, apart from objective merit and truth. In Resolution 11, 
Hoffman urged that a lawyer must abandon a claim or defense “[i]f, 
after duly examining a case” he is persuaded that the “client’s claim 
or defence . . . cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained.”91 The 
last clause of this Resolution hinted at both an objective merit and a 
just-cause standard for judging whether the position “ought” to be 
pressed: “reason to believe” that the position “would be denied . . . 
both by law and justice.”92 Hoffman’s particular application of these 
principles to civil defenses exemplified a just-cause duty that turned 
on morality. Hoffman admonished lawyers in civil cases to intercede 
 
And in Resolution 5 the lawyer promised that “[i]n all intercourse with 
my professional brethren, I will always be courteous.” Id. at 752. 
87. Resolution 41 demanded that the lawyer “carefully . . . abstain from 
all false, or deceptious readings; and from all uncandid omissions of any 
qualifications” of the legal doctrines relied upon. Id. at 770 
88. Id. at 755 (Resolution 14). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 754 (Resolution 11). 
92. Id. 
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and not present defenses such as the statute of limitation 93  or 
infancy,94 even if otherwise valid, if his client actually owed the debt. 
Hoffman claimed that a lawyer’s assertion of either defense, at least in 
some cases, would make the lawyer a “partner in [the client’s] 
knavery.”95 It would not be moral.96 He therefore urged the lawyer to 
be “the sole judge (the pleas not being compulsory) of the occasions 
proper for their use.”97 
Hoffman did not ignore client concerns. Although he did not state a 
duty of confidentiality, he stated duties of both competence 98 and 
loyalty.99 Moreover, Hoffman urged “zealous” advocacy: “[t]o my clients 
I will be faithful; and in their causes, zealous and industrious.”100 The 
major contrast to the view attributed to Lord Brougham was that 
Hoffman believed that a lawyer had many limits on his advocacy. 
Those limits seemingly included the lawyer’s own assessment of what 
was “right,” “moral,” or just.  
 
93. Id. (Resolution 12): “I will never plead the Statute of Limitations, when 
based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes 
the debt; and has no other defence than the legal bar, he shall never 
make me a partner in his knavery.”  
94. Id. (Resolution 13):  
I will never plead, or otherwise avail of the bar of the Infancy 
against an honest demand. If my client possesses the ability to 
pay, and has no other legal or moral defence than that it was 
contracted by him when under the age of twenty-one years, he 
must seek for other counsel to sustain him in such a defence. 
95. Id. (Resolution 12). 
96. See id. at 765 (Resolution 33): “What is morally wrong, cannot be 
professionally right, however it may be sanctioned by time or custom.” 
97. Id. at 755 (Resolution 13):  
And although in [infancy], as well as in that of limitation, the 
law has given the defence, and contemplates, in the one case, to 
induce claimants to a timely prosecution of their rights, and in 
the other, designs to protect a class of persons, who by reason of 
tender age are peculiarly liable to imposed on,—yet, in both 
cases, I shall claim to be the sole judge (the pleas not being 
compulsory) of the occasions proper for their use. 
98. Id. at 759 (Resolution 20): “Should I not understand my client’s cause, 
after due means to comprehend it, I will retain it no longer, but 
honestly confess it, and advise him to consult others, whose knowledge 
of the particular case may probably be better than my own.” 
99. Id. at 753 (Resolution 8): “I will never permit myself . . . to be 
engaged on the side of my former antagonist.” 
100. Id. at 758 (Resolution 18). 
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3. The Middle View 
The man most often cited as advocating a middle view, between 
that of Lord Brougham and Hoffman, is George Sharswood. 
Sharswood was a Professor and Dean at the University of 
Pennsylvania, and he later served as the Chief Justice of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court from 1879 to 1883.101 His 1854 An Essay 
on Professional Ethics was a seminal work.102 
Sharswood was not the lone voice in the middle. In all likelihood, 
most nineteenth century lawyers had a form of middle view. For 
example, Professors Zacharias and Green attribute the middle view to 
Sharswood’s predecessor as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, John Gibson. 103 They place particular reliance on an 1845 
opinion by Chief Justice Gibson in Rush v. Cavenaugh: in which Chief 
Justice Gibson stated that 
[i]t is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer 
owes no fidelity to any one except his client; and that the latter 
is the keeper of his professional conscience. He is expressly 
bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of 
attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as the client; 
and he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust 
judgment: much more so when he presses for the conviction of 
an innocent man.104 
Professors Zacharias and Green take from this language, 
particularly the reference to “an unjust judgment,” that Chief Justice 
Gibson’s view of proper advocacy was imbued with a sense of 
“professional conscience” that derived from norms “not necessarily 
. . . expressed in the law” and “not explicitly spelled out in the 
lawyer’s oath” but instead transmitted “through professional 
socialization.”105 In a previous article, I took slight issue with their 
conclusion, but only to the extent that it overlooked or downplayed 
the significance of the litigation oaths, particularly the older European 
oaths that stated a just-cause duty.106 Regardless of the source of the 
just-cause duty, Chief Justice Gibson’s efforts could be fairly 
 
101. See Memorial in George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional 
Ethics (5th ed. 1884) (discussing Sharswood’s life achievements). 
102. Sharswood, supra note 101; George Sharswood, An Essay on 
Professional Ethics, 32 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 1, 9 (1907) (special 
reprinting). 
103. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 3, at 45 (arguing that Justice 
Gibson’s middle ground fits between Broughman and Hoffman). 
104. Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845). 
105. Zacharias & Green, supra note 3, at 32.  
106. Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath, supra note 8, at 26–31. 
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characterized as attempting to define that duty. Sharswood did the 
same, and he relied upon the work of Chief Justice Gibson in doing 
so. In fact, in his essay, Sharswood quoted the above passage from the 
Rush case.107 Because Sharswood’s essay is more developed and well 
known, I use Sharswood as the model for the middle view.  
Sharswood structured his essay around three fundamental 
obligations: “[f]idelity to the court, fidelity to the client, fidelity to the 
claims of truth and honor.”108 This statement conceived of truth as an 
independent duty (the third on his list), but Sharswood also featured 
truth prominently in his discussion of the first listed duty, that of 
fidelity to the court. 109 His discussion of duties to the court also 
included multiple aspects of reasonable behavior, such as “respect” 
and equal temper.110  
Sharswood’s discussion of the second obligation (that to client) 
was a lengthy exposition in which he attempted to balance client 
needs against the lawyer’s other duties. According to Sharswood, the 
“topic of fidelity to the client involves the most difficult questions in 
the consideration of the duty of a lawyer.”111 He described competence 
as only a baseline duty to avoid legal malpractice liability.112 The 
duty to the client went beyond mere technical competence: it required 
zeal. “Entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the 
maintenance and defence of his rights, and the exertion of the utmost 
learning and ability” were, according to Sharswood, the moral 
responsibility of lawyers.113  
Warm zeal notwithstanding, Sharswood did not endorse the full 
client-oriented view. To the contrary, Sharswood characterized Lord 
Brougham’s statement as one “led by the excitement of so great an 
occasion to say what cool reflection and sober reason certainly never 
can approve.” 114  Sharswood believed that there were limits on a 
lawyer’s zeal. He framed the question in terms of what was “just and 
 
107. Sharswood, supra note 101, at 96–97. 
108. Id. at 58. 
109. See id. at 72 (“It need hardly be added that a practitioner ought to be 
particularly cautious, in all his dealings with the court, to use no deceit, 
imposition, or evasion—to make no statements of facts which he does 
not know or believe to be true . . . .”). 
110. Id. at 62, 64. 
111. Id. at 76. 
112. Id. at 76–78 (“He is legally responsible to his client only for the want of 
ordinary care and ordinary skill. . . . Though such be the extent of 
legal liability, that of moral responsibility is wider.”). 
113. Id. at 78–80. 
114. Id. at 87. 
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right” 115 (a just-cause duty), but he also acknowledged the difficulty 
in defining these limits with any specificity. “It may be delicate and 
dangerous ground to . . . descend to particulars upon such a 
subject.”116 Despite this danger, Sharswood offered his views, and to 
do so, he made several distinctions: between criminal and civil cases, 
between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants, between substantive 
defenses and defense tactics, and between tactics in defending just 
and unjust civil claims.117  
One of Sharswood’s concerns was reconciling the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants with the personal beliefs of the lawyer. 
He concluded that a lawyer may “exert all of his ability, learning and 
ingenuity, . . . even if he should be perfectly assured in his own mind 
of the actual guilt” of the criminal defense client. 118  Sharswood 
continued by imposing a strong just-cause duty on private 
prosecutors: “It is a different thing to engage as private counsel in a 
prosecution against a man whom he knows or believes to be innocent. 
. . . It ought never to be done against the counsel’s own opinions of 
its merits.”119 
On the civil side, Sharswood based much of his discussion on the 
distinction between just and unjust causes, and in doing so, he 
seemingly used a moral standard for “just.” As to proper litigation 
advocacy on behalf of civil plaintiffs, Sharswood’s position was similar 
to that of Hoffman. Sharswood began by noting that “the claim of a 
plaintiff stands upon a somewhat different footing” than a civil 
defendant.120 He explained that the “courts are open to the party in 
person to prosecute his own claim, and plead his own cause,” and a 
plaintiff chose to go to court, but the defendant did not.121 Sharswood 
believed that a lawyer had a duty to decline to represent plaintiffs in 
prosecuting claims that the lawyer considered unjust. “Counsel have 
an undoubted right, and are in duty bound, to refuse to be concerned 
for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand, which offends his sense 
of what is just and right.”122   
115. Id. at 81 (“[W]hat are the limits of [a lawyer’s] duty when the legal 
demands or interests of his client conflict with his own sense of what is 
just and right?”).  
116. Id. at 89.  
117. “There is a distinction to be made between the case of prosecution and 
defence for crimes; between appearing for a plaintiff in pursuit of an 
unjust claim, and for a defendant in resisting what appears to be a just 
one.” Id. at 90. 
118. Id. at 92. 
119. Id. at 93. 
120. Id. at 96. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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In contrast to Hoffman, Sharswood believed that a civil defense 
lawyer properly could assert defenses, such as the statute of 
limitation: “the legislature has seen fit in certain cases to assign a 
limit to the period within which actions shall be brought” and the 
“party has a right to have his cases decided upon the law and the 
evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the 
judges, which can legitimately bear upon the question.”123 According 
to Sharswood, the client himself perhaps should decide not to plead 
these defenses in some cases,124 but the client, not the lawyer, should 
make this decision. The lawyer is “not morally responsible” for the 
client’s decision.125 Moreover, to decline to assert the defense would be 
improper because to refuse “his professional assistance because in his 
judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of 
both judge and jury.”126  
Sharswood’s discussion of legal defense tactics, rather than the 
defense objectives, is subtle and not easy to grasp. He built his 
discussion on the distinction between modes of defending a just claim 
and an unjust claim. According to Sharswood, a lawyer defending a 
just claim should refrain from “insisting upon the slips of the opposite 
party, by sharp practice, or special pleading.” 127  By contrast, to 
defend an unjust claim, “the advocate may justly avail himself of 
every honorable ground to defeat” the claim. 128  The distinction 
between “sharp practice” and “honorable ground” is hard to decipher 
today, but Sharswood seemingly intended a difference in proper 
defense tactics, based on whether the defense lawyer perceived the 
plaintiff’s claim to be just.  
In sum, although Sharswood believed that the lawyer should act 
with zeal on behalf of his client, he also believed, like Hoffman, that 
zeal had important limits. A lawyer had higher duties, which included 
reasonable behavior, truth, and just-cause duties. Sharswood was 
more restrained than Hoffman on the application of the just-cause 
duty. Sharswood applied this duty fully to plaintiffs but not to civil 
defendants. A lawyer was duty bound to decline a civil claim that the 
lawyer believed was unjust, but the lawyer was duty bound to present 
civil defenses even if the defense violated the lawyer’s sense of justice.  
 
123. Id. at 83. 
124. See id. (“[A] defendant who knows that he honestly owes the debt sued 
for, and that the delay has been caused by indulgence or confidence on 
the part of his creditor, ought not to plead the statute.”). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 84.  
127. Id. at 99. 
128. Id. at 98.  
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The nineteenth-century discourse thus has much richer detail 
regarding proper litigation advocacy than the formal ethics 
statements of earlier eras. Much of the discussion involved subtle 
distinctions. The views of Lord Brougham, Hoffman, and Sharswood 
are not necessarily three distinct categories, but they are good 
shorthand references to different positions on the proper balance of 
zealous advocacy, on the one hand, and just cause, on the other. The 
view attributed to Lord Brougham symbolized a rejection of the just-
cause duty in favor of strong notions of zealous advocacy. The view 
attributed to Hoffman represented a strong duty of just cause and a 
limited conception of zealous advocacy. Sharswood symbolized a more 
nuanced position and a more delicate balance between zealous 
advocacy and just cause, although one tilted in favor of just cause. All 
three would influence and inform the next era of legal ethics 
standards—the regulations of the Field Code and of the bar codes. 
C. The Field Code Statutory Duties of Lawyers 
A major development in legal ethics in the United States came in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, when many states adopted 
the Field Code statement of duties of a lawyer. David Dudley Field 
drafted the “Field Code” in 1848, and it served as a model code for 
many states and territories in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.129 The Field Code is famous for its provisions governing civil 
procedure, but it also regulated attorney admission. Section 511 
stated eight statutory duties of a lawyer:  
1. To support the constitution and laws of the United States, 
and of this state 
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and 
judicial officers 
3. To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defences, 
only as appear to him legal and just, except the defence of a 
person charged with a public offence 
4. To employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes 
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with 
truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice 
or false statement of fact or law 
 
129. The “Field Code” is difficult to identify as a single document. Some 
authorities cite to the original code proposed by Field in 1848 as the 
“Field Code,” while others refer to the slightly modified version, 
published in 1850. I use the 1850 version. Comm’rs on Practice & 
Pleadings, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK (Weed, Parsons & Co. 1850) [hereinafter Field Code]. 
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5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to 
himself, to preserve the secrets, of his clients 
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no 
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or 
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with 
which he is charged 
7[.] Not to encourage either the commencement or the con-
tinuance of an action or proceeding, from any motive of 
passion or interest and  
8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the 
cause of the defenceless or the oppressed.130  
Field based his eight duties directly on the 1816 Swiss oath.131 
The Field Code stated the same truth and reasonableness duties to 
the court as did the Swiss oath, including the unique “unless” 
qualification on the reasonableness duty in the sixth clause.132 The key 
difference in content between the Field Code and the Swiss oath was 
the addition of a client duty—confidentiality—in the fifth clause. The 
Field Code also converted the oath vows to statutory obligations and 
provided for disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for the “wilful 
violation” of any of the duties.133  
The Field Code had a significant impact on American legal ethics. 
Within a few decades, seventeen states adopted the Field Code in 
some form.134 This was at a time of few formal regulatory standards of 
conduct for lawyers. Moreover, the Field Code added new content to 
standards of legal ethics in the United States. Its confidentiality duty 
was one of the earliest formal statements of confidentiality as a 
professional duty, and the just-cause duty was unique. 
The Field Code was the first codification of the just-cause duty in 
the United States. Justice Story, in 1832, had commended the just-
cause duty of the Justinian oath as an ideal,135 but the Field Code 
 
130. Field Code, supra note 129, § 511, at 204–05. 
131. See Field Code, supra note 129, § 511 cmt., at 205. (explaining that 
the Swiss oath “so justly [expresses] the general duties of lawyers, that 
we cannot do better than take almost the very terms of it”). 
132. See supra text accompanying note 66 (Swiss oath). 
133. See Field Code, supra note 129, § 525(4), at 216 (providing for 
professional discipline for a “wilful violation of any of the provisions of 
section 511”). 
134. See Andrews, Evolution, supra note 8, at 1426 n.284. 
135. Justice Story, in 1832, commended the Justinian oath as “well worthy” 
of “consideration of Christian lawyers in our day” and endorsed “two 
maxims” as “essential” of that oath: “never to defend a cause which is 
unjust” and “not to defend just causes but by way of justice and truth.” 
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seemingly was the first regulatory statement of the duty. The Field 
Code just-cause clause also seemingly was the first formal regulatory 
distinction made for the ethical duties of criminal defense lawyers, as 
opposed to lawyers in civil litigation. Under the Field Code, as in the 
Swiss oath, criminal defense lawyers were subject to other court 
duties, such as truth and reasonable behavior, but they did not have 
to consider whether their client’s cause was just.136 This distinction 
demonstrated not only that litigation standards differed in the civil 
and criminal context, but also that the just-cause duty was separate 
from other litigation duties owed to the court. 
This leaves the question of the meaning of the just-cause duty in 
civil litigation under the Field Code, particularly the criterion for 
determining what was just or unjust. Field’s commentary to the Code 
provides some insight. Field began by rejecting the view, which he 
attributed to Lord Brougham, that the lawyer must “lose sight of 
every other consideration than of success” as a doctrine “unsound in 
theory, and most pernicious in practice.”137  
Field then gave the example of a civil case in which the lawyer’s 
client claims title to land possessed by another. In this example, the 
lawyer knows, through confidential communications, that his client 
does not have a “just claim” to the land.138 The client and lawyer 
both know that the possessor owns the land but accidentally lost his 
proof of title. Field argued that this extreme example—which “[f]ew 
persons” would argue should be prosecuted—proved the unsoundness 
of the extreme view of advocacy attributed to Lord Brougham.139 
“But if the doctrine is a sound one, does not this follow? . . . If the 
advocate is to overlook the moral aspects of the claim, he must 
recover this property for his client.”140 Field’s use of the terms “just” 
and “moral aspects” suggested that he was interpreting the Field 
Code’s just cause clause. Yet condemnation of the land title case did 
not need to rest on notions of justness apart from truth and objective 
merit. The land title claim was false.  
Field also explained that a lawyer could present a statute of 
limitation defense on behalf of a civil defendant: a lawyer may “in 
civil cases present defences recognised and provided by law, although 
 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Agency § 24 (rev. 
9th ed., Little, Brown & Co., 1882); see Justinian Code, supra note 
20, lib. 3, tit. 1, l. 14. 
136. See Field Code, supra note 129, § 511(3), at 204.  
137. Id. § 511 cmt., at 207. 
138. Id. at 208. 
139. Id.  
140. Id. 
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he may himself disapprove of the principle and policy of the law.”141 
The distinction between the statute of limitation defense, which he 
permitted, and the land title hypothetical, which he condemned, gives 
insight to Field’s interpretation of the just-cause duty. In contrast to 
the land title hypothetical, the statute of limitation defense had 
factual and legal merit, even if the lawyer considered it morally unjust 
in a particular setting. The lawyer would not have to lie or misstate 
the law to present the defense. These examples suggested that Field, 
despite his use of the word “moral” in the land title discussion, took a 
restrained view of the just-cause duty, one of objective merit.  
Interestingly, Field’s own views may have evolved on the proper 
balance between zealous advocacy and duties to court. In his 
commentary to the Field Code, Field condemned the extreme view of 
advocacy attributed to Lord Brougham, but many modern commen-
tators argue that Field later adopted this view when he defended 
corporations and railroads in high profile cases.142 Thus, if anything, 
Field later took an even more restrained view (or rejection) of the 
just-cause duty of his Field Code. 
Restrained interpretations notwithstanding, the Field Code, as 
the first regulatory statement of a just-cause duty, arguably was a 
catalyst for further debate as to the proper limits on litigation 
advocacy. An important example came from Alabama. Alabama did 
not include the just-cause duty in its version of the Field Code 
statement of duties.143 The Alabama State Bar Association instead 
elaborated and set alternative limits on advocacy when it adopted a 
detailed code of ethics in 1887. 
D. The Litigation Standards of the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics  
In 1881, Thomas Goode Jones, who later served as both a federal 
judge and Alabama governor, proposed that the Alabama bar 
 
141. Id. at 209. 
142. Professor Hoeflich credited Field with renewing the view of Lord 
Brougham in the late nineteenth century: “Field responded to his critics 
and set forth a reinvigorated version of Brougham’s vision of the lawyer-
client relationship and of the lawyer’s overwhelming and singular 
obligation of fidelity to his client.” Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 815. 
Professor Shaffer cited Field as a major contributor to the “unsound” 
modern “adversary ethic” through his representation of “robber barons” 
in the late nineteenth century, in which Field “continually frustrated the 
judicial process” on behalf of these clients. Shaffer, supra note 3, at 703–
09. See generally Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 814–16 (discussing Field’s 
legal work, his critics, and his responses). 
143. See Memorandum for Use of American Bar Association’s 
Committee to Draft Canons of Professional Ethics 112 (1908) 
(on file with Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter The Red Book]. 
Georgia and Mississippi also did not include the just-cause duty. Id.; see 
also infra notes 176–82 (discussing The Red Book). 
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association commission a code of legal ethics.144 Jones argued that a 
code of ethics was necessary because, although Sharswood and others 
had written “standard works of great eminence and authority upon 
legal ethics,” these works were “not always accessible.” 145  Jones 
believed that many cases of improper conduct could be avoided if the 
lawyers had “in easy reach” a “short, concise Code of Legal Ethics, 
stamped with the approval of the Bar.”146 In 1887, the Alabama bar 
membership debated and approved a “Code of Ethics.”147 It was the 
first of its kind.148 
The 1887 Alabama Code was far more detailed than any that had 
come before. The preamble to the code began by reprinting Alabama’s 
version of the Field Code duties, which the code described as a 
“comprehensive summary of the duties specifically enjoined by law 
upon attorneys.”149 This single page of Field Code duties was followed 
by fifty-seven rules, spanning thirteen pages.150  
These rules stated many basic duties to the client, including 
litigation duties. The Alabama Code indirectly addressed competence, 
by specifying a number of good practices, such as punctuality.151 It 
also stated duties of loyalty152 and confidentiality in litigation.153  
 
144. See David I. Durham, A Call for Regulation of the Profession, in 
Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 1–4 (discussing formation of the Alabama 
Code and Jones’s role as draftsman). 
145. Thos. G. Jones, Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration 
and Remedial Procedure, in Report of the Organization and of 
the First, Second and Third Annual Meetings of the Alabama 
State Bar Association 224, 235 (1882), reprinted in Gilded Age, 
supra note 8, at 91.  
146. Id. 
147. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Alabama 
State Bar Association 8–22 (1888) (reporting the bar debate and 
approval of code), reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 93–109. 
148. See Andrews, Evolution, supra note 8, at 1385 (discussing bar 
association codes of ethics). 
149. See Ala. St. Bar Ass’n Code of Ethics pmbl. (1887), reprinted in 
Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 46, 47. 
150. Ala. St. Bar Ass’n Code of Ethics (1887), reprinted in Gilded 
Age, supra note 8, at 45–59. 
151. See Ala. St. Bar Ass’n Code of Ethics R. 33 (warning against 
procrastination and urging prompt preparation for trial), reprinted in 
Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 55. 
152. See R. 25 (barring conflicts of interests in litigation without informed 
consent of client and urging lawyers “even then” to avoid such 
“embarrassing” conflicts), reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 
53. 
153. See R. 21, R. 22 (addressing confidentiality concerns of current and 
former clients), reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 52. 
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As to zeal and its limits, the Alabama rules tended to follow the 
views of Sharswood. Rule 10 of the 1887 Alabama Code followed 
Sharswood in rejecting the all-out view attributed to Lord Brougham. 
Rule 10 complained that the “popular prejudice against lawyers” 
stemmed from the “false claim” that “it is an attorney’s duty to do 
everything to succeed in his client’s cause.”154 Yet, like Sharswood, the 
1887 Alabama Code did not abandon zeal but rather endorsed zeal 
with limits. Alabama Rule 10 quoted Sharswood’s “warm zeal” 
exhortation and immediately stated limits on that zeal:  
An attorney “owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, 
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his cause, and the 
exertion of the utmost skill and ability,” to the end, that 
nothing may be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules 
of law, legally applied. No sacrifice or peril, even to loss of life 
itself, can absolve [the lawyer] from the fearless discharge of this 
duty. Nevertheless, it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the 
great trust is to be performed within, and not without the 
bounds of the law which creates it . . . and it does not permit, 
much less demand, violation of law, or any manner of fraud or 
chicanery, for the client’s sake.155  
Many other rules stated duties that limited advocacy. The 
primary limits were truth and reasonable behavior. Rule 5 stated that 
“the utmost candor and fairness should characterize the dealings of 
attorneys with the courts and with each other.” 156  Rule 5 also 
enumerated several “deceits and evasions unworthy of attorneys,” 
including “[k]nowingly citing as authority an overruled case, or 
treating a repealed statute as in existence,” “knowingly misstating the 
contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, or the language or 
argument of opposite counsel,” and “offering evidence which it is 
known the court must reject as illegal, to get it before the jury.”157  
As to reasonable behavior and tactics, the 1887 Alabama Code 
was filled with rules of decorum, including a warning against a 
“display [of] temper.”158 Rule 1 demanded respect for the courts,159 
and Rule 3 urged lawyers to avoid “[m]arked attention and unusual 
hospitality” to a judge.160 Rule 5 condemned a number of practices, 
 
154. R. 10, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 49–50. 
155. Id., reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 50. 
156. R. 5, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 48. 
157. Id. 
158. R. 7, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 49. 
159. R. 1, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 47. 
160. R. 3, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 48. 
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such as “‘side-bar’ remarks and sparring discourse.” 161  Rule 30 
provided that the lawyer “must be allowed to judge” matters of 
means, which the 1887 Alabama Code characterized as “incidental 
matters . . . not affecting the merits of the cause.”162 
Like the Alabama version of the Field Code, the 1887 Alabama 
Code did not state a just-cause duty.163 Rule 14 seemingly was the 
replacement for the just-cause duty, at least as applied to civil 
plaintiffs.164 The 1887 Alabama Code did not impose any standard for 
civil defendants other than the various duties of reasonable and 
truthful conduct, applicable to all litigation. As to civil plaintiffs, 
Rule 14 provided that an attorney “must decline in a civil cause to 
conduct a prosecution, when satisfied that the purpose is merely to 
harass or injure the opposite party, or to work oppression and 
wrong.”165 To some extent, the Alabama rule standard—“to work 
oppression and wrong”—connoted a just-cause duty, but Alabama 
Rule 14 turned on specific ill motives of the plaintiff, not the lawyer’s 
sense of justice. Sharswood, by contrast, framed the lawyer’s decision 
to represent a civil plaintiff as a question of whether the cause 
“offends [the lawyer’s] sense of what is just and right.”166  
Rule 14 seemingly imposed on the plaintiff’s lawyer both an 
affirmative duty to decline and a continuing duty to withdraw from 
improperly motivated causes. This is particularly evident from the 
drafting history of Rule 14. A proposed version of Rule 14 phrased the 
initial ability to decline as a matter as discretion (“may” instead of 
“must”), but the Alabama bar membership made it mandatory.167 The 
initial proposal also would have required greater zeal after taking on a 
plaintiff’s cause. It would have required a lawyer “to avail himself of 
all lawful advantages” and forbade the lawyer from withdrawing. 168 
The bar membership also rejected that proposal.169  
 
161. R. 5, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 49. 
162. R. 30 (“No client has a right to demand that his attorney should be 
illiberal in such matters, or that he should do anything therein 
repugnant to his own sense of honor and propriety; and if such course is 
insisted on, the attorney should retire from the cause.”), reprinted in 
Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 54.  
163. See supra text accompanying note 143 (discussing Alabama’s rejection 
of Field Code just-cause duty). 
164. R. 14, reprinted in Gilded Age, supra note 8, at 51. 
165. Id. 
166. Sharswood, supra note 101, at 96; see supra notes 108–26 (discussing 
Sharswood’s position). 
167. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Alabama 
State Bar Association, supra note 147, at 19. 
168. Id. The proposed additional clause stated: “but once entering the cause 
he is bound to avail himself of all lawful advantages in favor of his 
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In sum, the 1887 Alabama Code required, but limited, zeal by 
imposing duties of reasonable behavior and truth on all litigation 
advocacy. The 1887 Alabama Code followed Sharswood’s distinctions 
between civil plaintiffs and defendants and imposed higher standards 
on plaintiff’s lawyers, but Alabama modified the standard. In 
Alabama, which rejected the Field Code just-cause duty, the lawyer 
had to assess whether the plaintiff was bringing the claim for 
improper motives, rather than whether the lawyer believed it to be 
just. As to the underlying defense objectives, a lawyer, under the 1887 
Alabama Code, could assert civil defenses so long as the lawyer 
complied with the truth and reasonableness standards.  
The 1887 Alabama Code thus set a balance of proper litigation 
advocacy different from that of Lord Brougham, David Hoffman, 
George Sharswood, and David Dudley Field. Some differences were 
subtle, but its detail and regulatory effect were important steps in the 
evolution of ethics standards for proper litigation advocacy. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, ten states had adopted codes 
modeled on the 1887 Alabama Code, and others were considering 
adopting similar codes.170 The 1887 Alabama Code soon would become 
the model for the national standards of the American Bar Association. 
IV. Modern ABA Model Litigation Standards  
In the early twentieth century, the American Bar Association 
took the lead in developing legal ethics standards for the entire 
nation. These efforts took three primary forms: the 1908 Canons of 
Ethics and model oath, the 1969 Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Most states have adopted one version of these model standards, as 
regulatory rules of conduct, most typically the Model Rules.171 The 
end result today is a detailed set of binding conduct rules that address 
a full array of lawyer conduct and behavior. 
 
client, and can not, without the consent of the client, afterwards 
abandon the cause.” Id. 
169. Id. (“On motion of Thos. G. Jones, the balance of the rule after the 
word ‘wrong’ . . . was stricken out.”). 
170. See 1907 ABA Report, supra note 84, at 685 (explaining that “[t]he 
Code of the Alabama State Bar Association . . . is the foundation of” 
ethical codes adopted by the state bar associations of Colorado, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and West Virginia). 
171. See Stephen Gillers, Roy D. Simon & Andrew M. Perlman, 
Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards, at xxiv 
(concise ed. 2011) (providing multiple states’ recent changes in 
professional codes, and specifically noting that California is the final 
state that “has not yet adopted some form of the ABA model rules”).  
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A recurring and prominent issue in each of the ABA formulations 
was the limits on proper litigation advocacy. The 1908 standards took 
a compromise position, and in doing so, it stated standards somewhat 
at odds with each other, at least as to the proper balance between 
zealous advocacy and just cause. The Model Code moved more 
significantly toward zealous advocacy, and the Model Code era was 
the zenith of a zealous advocacy model in formal ethical standards. 
The Model Rules soon retreated from this position, but the Model 
Rules did not resurrect just cause. Today, both zealous advocacy and 
just cause have ebbed (but not totally disappeared) as concepts, at 
least as far as their embodiment in regulatory rules. The Model Rules 
take an intermediate position that prioritizes truth, reasonable 
behavior and objective merit.  
A. The 1908 ABA National Model Standards 
The ABA’s promulgation of national model standards began in 
1905.172 The ABA used the 1887 Alabama Code as a model for its 
proposed set of Canons of Ethics, and it used the Field Code as the 
basis for a model oath.173 The ABA sent to its entire membership its 
proposed canons and model oath, along with other ethics works, 
including the Field Code, the 1816 Swiss oath, a version of the “do no 
falsehood” oath, Hoffman’s Resolutions, and Sharswood’s essay.174 
The ABA asked its members for comments on the entire package 
and, in an “earnest[ ] request,” directed their attention to an issue 
that it termed “accept[ance of] retainers” and which asked members 
to comment on the limits of representation with a particular focus on 
Sharswood’s views:  
We also earnestly request that . . . you give us the benefit of 
your advice, crystallized into specific canons, concerning the 
principles which should ever guide the lawyer, true to his 
country, his client and himself, in accepting the retainers of 
individuals and of corporations and in representing or advising 
them, knowing that by virtue of the establishment of the 
 
172. See generally Altman, supra note 2, at 2402–16 (detailing history of the 
1908 model standards). 
173. 1907 ABA Report, supra note 84, at 676–90. 
174. Id. at 676–736 (compilation of ethics materials, including 1887 Alabama 
Code, Alabama’s version of the Field Code, Michigan’s “no falsehood” 
oath, Louisiana Bar Association’s Code of Ethics, Washington state 
oath, the Field Code in oath form, the 1816 Swiss oath, the 1683 oath of 
Denmark and Norway, David Hoffman’s resolutions, and a twentieth-
century German lawyer’s oath). The ABA distributed a separately 
bound copy of Sharswood’s essay. George Sharswood, An Essay on 
Professional Ethics, 32 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 1, 9 (1907). Sharwood’s 
essay is discussed and quoted supra in the text accompanying notes 
108–26. 
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relation of counsel and client it will be his duty, within the 
scope of the retainer, to guard by every honorable means and to 
the best of his learning and ability the legal rights of the client. 
A full discussion of the principles involved will be found running 
throughout Sharswood’s Ethics.175 
The ABA received more than 1,000 letters in response, reflecting 
a full range of views as to proper litigation advocacy.176 Comments 
regarding the proposed model oath are especially illustrative because 
the oath stated a just-cause duty. Simeon Baldwin, the founder and 
former president of the ABA,177 reported that the oath’s just-cause 
clause was “subject to serious criticism” because the clause required 
the lawyer to be “satisfied that a suit or defence is just, before he can 
take the first step in court.”178 For example, one member questioned: 
“Is it plain, even that [the just-cause clause] is correct? May a man 
not argue what he thinks is not the law to a Court? He may be 
wrong—and to decide is the Court’s job?”179 This criticism was not 
universal. 180  Thomas Hubbard, a prominent legal ethicist and a 
member of the ABA drafting committee,181 urged the ABA to state a 
just-cause duty in both the model oath and the Canons of Ethics.182  
 
175. The Red Book, supra note 143, at 98. 
176. 1908 ABA Report, supra note 2, at 570–71. The ABA drafting 
committee compiled the “more important and complete replies” in a 
memorandum, which became known as The Red Book. The Red Book, 
supra note 143, at 3; see also Altman, supra note 2, at 2416–18 
(discussing The Red Book).  
177. See Altman, supra note 2, at 2417, n.142 (discussing Baldwin’s role in 
founding the ABA, his political and judicial career in Connecticut, and 
his professorship at Yale Law School). 
178. Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 Colum. 
L. Rev. 541, 545 (1908). See generally Carle, supra note 2, at 22–24 
(collecting critiques and comments in opposition to just-cause clause of 
model oath). 
179. The Red Book, supra note 143, at 113. 
180. Id. at 108 (stating that the Washington oath, including the Field Code’s 
just-cause duty, was “an excellent form”). Professor Carle reported that 
“[a] seemingly odd coalition” of members, both within and without the 
drafting committee, supported the clause. Carle, supra note 2, at 18; see 
also id. at 18–21 (collecting commentary). 
181. Thomas Hubbard taught legal ethics at the Albany Law School, where 
he established a foundation for legal ethics. Carle, supra note 2, at 18; 
see also id. at 35 (biographical summary of Thomas Hubbard). 
182. Hubbard proposed an addition to Canon 15 that would restate the just-
cause duty of the Field Code. The Red Book, supra note 143, at 107. 
Hubbard in a speech urged the importance of this duty: “The whole 
oath puts the responsibility of bringing suit, interposing defense, and of 
conducting either, exactly where that responsibility should be put, upon 
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The end result of the ABA debate was a nuanced position that 
had internal inconsistency, at least between the final versions of the 
model oath and Canons of Ethics. In the final model oath,183 the ABA 
stated a restrained version of the just-cause duty: “I will not counsel 
or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be 
unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly 
debatable under the law.” 184  The Field Code stated the duty 
affirmatively and subjected all claims and defenses, except criminal 
defenses, to the just standard. The ABA oath reversed the standard, 
from “just” to “unjust”185 and, like Sharswood, applied it only to civil 
 
the conscience and honor of the lawyer.” Altman, supra note 2, at 2450 
n.312. 
183. The ABA model oath, adopted in 1908, stated: 
I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: 
 
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of . . . ; 
 
I will maintain the respect due the Courts of Justice and judicial 
officers; 
 
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall 
appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I 
believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land; 
 
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided 
to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, 
and will never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice 
or false statement of fact or law; 
 
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets 
of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with 
his business except from him or with his knowledge and 
approval; 
 
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact 
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, 
unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am 
charged; 
 
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, 
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man’s 
cause for lucre or malice. SO HELP ME GOD.  
1908 ABA Report, supra note 2, at 585 (commending the model oath 
“for adoption by the proper authorities in all the states and 
territories”). 
184. Id.; see also Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath, supra note 8, at 38–43 (discussing 
the differences between the Field Code and the 1908 ABA model oath). 
185. Simeon Baldwin described the turn of the phrase from “just” to “unjust” 
as rendering the duty “much less onerous” because the lawyer no longer 
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plaintiffs and criminal prosecutors (“suit or proceeding”), not defenses 
of any kind, civil or criminal. 186 Nevertheless, even with its new 
phrasing, the model oath “unjust” ban for civil plaintiffs meant 
something more than lack of objective merit, given that the same 
clause imposed an objective merit standard (“honestly debatable”) to 
defenses.187  
As to the final Canons of Ethics, the ABA’s position on litigation 
advocacy was similar, but not identical, to that of the 1887 Alabama 
Code. First, the Canons of Ethics stated litigation duties to the client. 
The Canons of Ethics, like the 1887 Alabama Code, only indirectly 
spoke to competence by specifying good practices, particularly 
punctuality. 188  Canon 6 stated a duty of loyalty and addressed 
confidentiality.189 The Canons of Ethics also stated the duty of zeal. 
Canon 15 quoted the portion of the 1887 Alabama Code, including 
Sharswood’s “warm zeal” exhortation.190 Yet, like the 1887 Alabama 
Code and many other voices of the era, the new Canons of Ethics 
immediately condemned the view that the lawyer must “do whatever 
may enable him to succeed in winning the client’s cause.”191  
The Canons of Ethics stated duties to the court that limited 
client duties. Canon 22 was a close replica of the truth duties of Rule 
5 of the 1887 Alabama Code, condemning several deceits and 
“unworthy” practices. 192  Several canons imposed obligations of 
reasonable behavior.193  
had to affirmatively satisfy himself that the case was just. Baldwin, 
supra note 178, at 545. 
186. According to the report of the ABA drafting committee, it “reframed the 
third paragraph of the recommended form for oath of admission, 
embodying therein the distinction, indicated by Sharswood . . . which 
should be made ‘between the case of prosecution and defense for crimes; 
between appearing for a plaintiff in pursuit of an unjust claim, and for a 
defendant in resisting what appears to be a just one.’” 1908 ABA Report, 
supra note 2, at 572 (quoting Sharswood, supra note 101, at 90). 
187. Id. at 585. 
188. Id. at 580 (Canon 21: “Punctuality and Expedition”). 
189. Id. at 576–77 (Canon 6: “Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests”). 
190. Id. at 579 (Canon 15: “How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a 
Client’s Cause”). 
191. Id.  
192. Id. at 581 (Canon 22: “Candor and Fairness”); see Gilded Age, supra 
note 8, at 114–15 (comparing Rule 5 of the 1887 Alabama Code with 
final Canons’ text). 
193. 1908 ABA Report, supra note 2, at 575, (Canon 1: “The Duty of the 
Lawyer to the Courts”); id. at 580 (Canon 17: “Ill Feeling and 
Personalities Between Advocates”); id. (Canon 18: “Treatment of 
Witnesses and Litigants”); id. (Canon 21: “Punctuality and 
Expedition”). 
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Both Canon 15 and Canon 30 stated an objective merit standard, 
at least as to law. Canon 15 referred to remedies and defenses 
“authorized by the law of the land.”194 Canon 30 referred to the “legal 
merits” of the client’s claim, and it concluded by stating that the 
lawyer’s appearance acted as an assertion that the “client’s case is one 
proper for judicial determination.” 195 This assertion provision was 
similar to the affirmation in the federal equity rule, but the equity 
rule stated a more obvious objective merit standard, “good ground for 
the suit.”196  
The Canons of Ethics did not impose an affirmative just-cause 
duty. In civil cases, Canon 31, entitled “Responsibility for Litigation,” 
gave the lawyer discretion whether to accept a civil client, plaintiff or 
defendant.197 Canon 31 cautioned that the responsibility “for bringing 
questionable suits” and “questionable defenses” was the “lawyer’s 
responsibility” and that the lawyer could not escape his responsibility 
by saying that he was “only following his client’s instructions.”198 This 
seemingly permitted a lawyer to consider the justness of a client’s 
civil cause and decline cases that the lawyer considered unjust, but it 
did not require him to do so.  
The only affirmative duty in the Canons of Ethics to decline a 
civil case was phrased in terms of the client’s motive, similar to Rule 
14 of the 1887 Alabama Code, but applicable to both civil plaintiffs 
and defendants. Interestingly, Canon 30 was entitled “Justifiable and 
Unjustifiable Litigations” and seemingly was an alternative standard 
for “just” and “unjust.”199 Canon 30 began by using a motive stand-
ard: a “lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a 
defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to 
injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.”200 Canon 
30 continued, “[b]ut otherwise it is his right and, having accepted 
retainer, it becomes his duty to insist upon the judgment of the Court 
as to the legal merits of his client’s claim.” 201  This imposed a 
spectrum of duties. First, the lawyer could decline a civil case for any 
reason, including the justness of the cause, and the lawyer must 
decline if the cause—claim or defense—was either improperly 
 
194. Id. at 579 (Canon 15). 
195. Id. at 583 (Canon 30). 
196. R. Prac. Cts. Equity 24, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli, xlviii (1842). Under 
the Equity Rules, the attorney’s signature acted as an affirmation that 
the suit had “good ground” to support it. Id. 
197. 1908 ABA Report, supra note 2, at 583. 
198. Id. at 583–84. 
199. Id. at 583. 
200. Id. 
201. Id.  
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motivated or lacked objective merit. Then, as to existing civil clients, 
the lawyer had to affirmatively press claims and defenses that had 
both objective merit and proper motive.  
These portions of the Canons of Ethics were at odds with the 
model oath on proper civil litigation advocacy in subtle but multiple 
respects. The just-cause duty of the model oath required a lawyer to 
neither “counsel [n]or maintain” a civil plaintiff’s cause that appeared 
to the lawyer to be “unjust.”202 The ABA models thus stated different 
standards for accepting clients as an initial matter: one a matter of 
discretion and the other a mandate. While the 1908 Canons of Ethics 
gave the lawyer discretion to decline a plaintiff’s clause as an initial 
matter for whatever reason, the model oath required that the lawyer 
decline an unjust matter for a plaintiff. A more critical difference 
came in representation of an accepted client. If the lawyer later came 
to believe that the plaintiff’s cause was unjust, the model oath 
required withdrawal, but the Canons of Ethics required the opposite. 
Canon 30 mandated that the lawyer persist in maintaining the claim 
based on its legal merit, so long as it was not improperly motivated. 
The lawyer could not withdraw based on his own assessment of the 
justness of the cause.  
The distinction cannot be reconciled by defining the unjust 
standard in the model oath to mean lack of legal merit. This arguably 
was the interpretation suggested by Field in his commentary,203 but 
the model oath clause did not permit this reading. The just-cause 
clause of the model oath itself distinguished between an unjust 
standard, which the model oath applied to plaintiff’s claim, and an 
objective merit standard (“honestly debatable”), which the model 
oath applied to civil defendants. To the extent that the Canons of 
Ethics differed from the model oath, the model oath should have 
prevailed, at least in theory. The model oath—not the Canons of 
Ethics—was the regulatory portion of the 1908 ethics compilation; the 
model oath was intended to “be given operative and binding force.”204 
In sum, the ABA 1908 model standards—model oath and Canons 
of Ethics—represented yet another nuanced, and in some ways 
confusing, position on the proper limits on litigation advocacy. 
Professor Susan Carle characterized the “duty to do justice” as a 
fundamental divide among the participants to the ABA’s 1908 model 
ethics project and one as to which the drafters “adopted ineffectual 
compromise language.”205 She argued that the final result was an 
 
202. Id. at 585.  
203. See supra notes 180–86. 
204. 1908 ABA Report, supra note 2, at 570 (quoting Sharswood, supra 
note 101, at 90).  
205. Carle, supra note 2, at 1. 
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“ambivalent compromise” that “merely concealed [the ABA’s] internal 
division and left future generations of lawyers to debate the issue 
anew.”206 This is undoubtedly true. The inconsistency between Canon 
30 and the just-cause duty of the model oath certainly was 
“ineffectual,” and future generations continued to debate the issue. 
The division and need for further debate were not surprising. It was 
part of a much longer debate in the United States, one that arose 
from a somewhat ill-defined inherited tradition as to the proper limits 
on litigation advocacy beyond truth and reasonable behavior. It was a 
debate that would continue well past the ABA’s 1908 project. 
B. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
Over the next few decades, the ABA supplemented the 1908 
Canons of Ethics with ethics opinions and additional canons as to many 
ethical matters, including litigation advocacy, but eventually the ABA 
recognized the need for more meaningful revision.207 At the same time, 
court rules governing procedure in civil cases, particularly the rules for 
federal court, developed and refined standards for litigation filings. In 
1912, the federal equity rule was amended to add a motive element to 
the objective standard. The signature certified not only that there was 
“good ground” for the pleading but also that it was “not interposed for 
delay.”208 In 1938, the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposed, in 
Rule 11, that the attorney certify that civil pleadings have both “good 
ground to support it” and no motive of “delay.”209  
In August 1969, the ABA reformulated the 1908 Canons of Ethics 
into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 210 The Model 
Code was longer and more complex than the 1908 Canons of Ethics. 
The Model Code had three components: canons (nine broadly worded 
principles), ethical considerations (multiple paragraphs discussing 
 
206. Id. at 33. 
207. Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 
1063, 1069 (1978) (discussing 1958 study on revision of the Canons). 
208. R. Prac. Cts. Equity 24, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli, xlviii (1842). See 
generally Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A 
First Amendment Challenge, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 665, 692–704 (2000) 
[hereinafter Andrews, Motive Restrictions] (addressing historical 
evolution of motive standards on filing suit). 
209. Federal courts interpreted the certification provision of the 1938 version 
of Federal Rule 11 as imposing a subjective merit standard that tested 
whether the lawyer himself knew or believed the pleading to have legal 
and factual merit. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 208, at 
706–07.  
210. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility (1969); see also 1969 ABA 
Report, supra note 2, at 729–96 (reprinting the Model Code); id. at 389 
(approving the Model Code). 
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each Canon), and disciplinary rules (black letter rules tailored to each 
Canon).  
As a general matter, the Model Code put client duties in greater 
prominence than had the Canons of Ethics or other historical 
standards. For example, an entire Canon addressed confidentiality, 
whereas confidentiality often was addressed only cryptically or 
indirectly in many historical works.211 Similarly, competence also was 
the topic of one of the nine canons.212 
Most significant was zealous advocacy. The principal canon 
addressing litigation conduct, Canon 7, broadly stated that “[a] 
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the 
law.”213 This section on zealous representation was one of the most 
lengthy in the Model Code. The accompanying ethical considerations 
consisted of many paragraphs and footnotes explaining the duty of 
zealous representation. Ethical Consideration 7-19 explained the 
rationale for zealous advocacy: “the advocate, by his zealous 
preparation and presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to 
come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render 
impartial judgments.”214 For this reason, the Model Code explained, 
the “duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system 
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of 
the law.”215  
Importantly, the Model Code imposed zealous advocacy as a 
black-letter rule. Disciplinary Rule 7-101, entitled “Representing a 
Client Zealously,” imposed an affirmative duty to pursue all 
legitimate objectives and means of the client.216 This disciplinary rule 
provided that a lawyer “shall not intentionally . . . [f]ail to seek 
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means 
permitted by law and the disciplinary rules.” 217 This suggested a 
preference for zealous advocacy over any duty of just cause. Other 
parts of the Model Code explained the limited role of the lawyer’s 
own sense of morality. Ethical Consideration 7-8 stated that a lawyer 
 
211. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Canon 4 (1969) (“A Lawyer 
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client”). The 1908 
Canons, for example, addressed confidentiality indirectly, in its 
discussion of loyalty. See 1908 ABA Report, supra note 2, at 576–77 
(Canon 6: “Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests”).  
212. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Canon 6 (“A Lawyer Should 
Represent a Client Competently”). 
213. Canon 7 (“Zealous Representation”).  
214. EC 7-19. 
215. Id. 
216. DR 7-101. 
217. Id.  
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may counsel a client on factors that “may lead to a decision that is 
morally just as well as legally permissible,” but “the decision whether 
to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal 
factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.”218 Ethical 
Consideration 7-7 stated that in civil cases, a client, not the lawyer, 
must decide whether to present affirmative defenses.219  
Even with this emphasis on zealous advocacy, the Model Code 
imposed limits on advocacy. Disciplinary Rule 7-101 conditioned its 
duty of zealous advocacy by stating that a “lawyer does not violate 
this [duty] . . . by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel 
which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being punctual in 
fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, 
or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in 
the legal process.”220 The remaining disciplinary rules under Canon 7 
set out a variety of duties owed to the court. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 
specified truth duties, barring use of false evidence221 and requiring 
remedy of false evidence in some circumstances.222 Disciplinary Rule 7-
106 set out numerous duties of reasonable behavior.223  
The Model Code did not set out a just-cause duty. The Model 
Code stated its affirmative limits on advocacy either in terms of effect 
or objective merit. Disciplinary Rule 7-102 barred a lawyer from 
bringing a claim or defense “when he knows or when it is obvious that 
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure 
another.” 224  This was a subtle evolution of the motive standard, 
previously used in both the 1887 Alabama Code and the 1908 Canons 
of Ethics.225 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 did not turn on subjective intent 
but instead effect—whether the action “would serve merely to 
harass.” A second paragraph of the same rule imposed an objective 
merit standard for legal arguments.226  
 
218. EC 7-8. 
219. EC 7-7. 
220. DR 7-101. 
221. DR 7-102(A)(3)–(6). 
222. DR 7-102(B). 
223. DR 7-106 (1969).  
224. DR 7-102(A)(1). This Disciplinary Rule was entitled “Representing a 
Client within the Bounds of the Law.” Id.  
225. For further discussion of this evolution and DR 7-102, see Carol Rice 
Andrews, The First Amendment Problem with the Motive Restrictions 
in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 24 J. Legal Prof. 13, 17–28 
(2000) [hereinafter Andrews, First Amendment Problem]. 
226. DR 7-102(A)(2) (barring a lawyer from knowingly advancing a claim or 
defense that is unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
change in the law). 
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In sum, the Model Code era was the heyday of zealous 
representation in terms of regulatory standards. Zealous advocacy was 
an affirmative duty and just cause was not. Nevertheless, even with 
this unprecedented prominence, zealous advocacy had many limits. It 
was not a paramount duty over the lawyer’s many duties to the 
court. Truth, reasonable behavior, and objective merit remained 
superior. 
C. The Model Oath and the Just-Cause Duty 
During the reformulation of the Canons of Ethics into the Model 
Code, the model oath was left alone, but the model oath soon would 
have its own revision. A lawyer named Murray Seasongood 
campaigned for two decades to delete the just-cause duty from the 
model oath.227 He argued that it unfairly subjected a civil plaintiff to 
a different standard than a defendant.228 Seasongood also objected to 
the “unjust” standard itself, arguing that it improperly required a 
lawyer to prejudge his client’s cause.229 He eventually succeeded.  
In 1977, the ABA deleted the unjust standard from the clause and 
subjected all litigation proceedings—claims and defenses—to the same 
objective merit standard.230 The revised model oath was as follows: “I 
will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding . . . nor any 
defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the 
law of the land.”231 This was the lone modification to the ABA model 
oath after its adoption in 1908.  
In theory, this was an important change, representing the ABA’s 
final rejection of any form of a just-cause duty. The change, however, 
was largely overlooked. First, the model oath itself was largely 
forgotten. At one time, the ABA prominently featured the model oath 
alongside the canons,232 but today, model ethics compilations do not 
include the model oath. The ABA never formally repealed the model 
 
227. Murray Seasongood, A Sequel to “What Employments Must a Lawyer 
Accept,” 9 Prac. Law. 41, 41–42 (1963) [hereinafter Seasongood, 
Sequel]; Murray Seasongood, What Employments Must a Lawyer Accept, 
1956 Prac. Law. 43, 48–49. 
228. Seasongood, Sequel, supra note 227, at 42.  
229. Id. at 42–43. 
230. Proceedings of the 1977 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 102 
Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 205, 224–25 (1977) (adopting revision of oath). 
231. Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, 102 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 25 (recommending change). 
232. See Canons of Professional Ethics, 62 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 1105 (1937) 
(reprinting canons and model oath).  
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oath, and its current status as a model is unknown, even within the 
ABA.233  
Ironically, the fading prominence of the model oath resulted in 
many states keeping the old form of oath that stated a just-cause 
duty. No state seems to have ever adopted the 1977 revised version of 
the model oath. Florida,234 Louisiana,235 South Dakota,236 Wisconsin237 
and Washington, 238  for example, use the 1908 ABA model oath 
language, which bars a lawyer from bringing claims he believes to be 
unjust, but which subjects all defenses, civil and criminal, to the 
honestly debatable standard. Others, such as Arizona,239 California,240 
Minnesota,241 Michigan,242 and Nebraska,243 contain a statutory just-
cause duty similar to the original Field Code version. Indiana244 and 
New Mexico245 use both versions of the just-cause duty, one in oath 
form and the other as a statutory duty. These duties, whether stated 
in terms of a “just” or “unjust” cause, seem to be more the result of 
 
233. See Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath, supra note 8, at 44 (discussing possible 
“archive” status of model oath). 
234. Oath of Admission, Fla. Rules of Ct. 2015 (West 2012). 
235. Louisiana’s Bar Association’s website provides a 1908 ABA form oath. 
Lawyer’s Oath, La. Sup. Ct. Committee on Bar Admissions, 
www.lascba.org/lawyers_oath.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
236. S.D. Codified Laws § 16-16-18 (2004). 
237. Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 40.15 (West 2012). 
238. Washington combines the 1908 ABA “unjust” causes with the Field 
Code exception for criminal cases. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 2.48.210 
(West 2004) (“I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding 
which shall appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I 
believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land, unless it be 
in defense of a person charged with a public offense . . . .”). 
239. Ariz. Rules of Ct. 41 (West 2011). 
240. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068 (West 2003).  
241. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 358.07(9) (West 2012).  
242. Mich. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 15 § 3(1) (“I will pursue a claim 
only if it is just, and will offer a defense only if it may be honestly 
debatable.”).  
243. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-105 (2007). 
244. Indiana updated its oath in 2005. Ind. Rules of Ct. 22 (West 2011). 
As its statutory duties, Indiana uses a modified version of the Field 
Code list. Ind. Code Ann. § 33-43-1-3 (West 2004). 
245. New Mexico uses a version of the 1908 model oath. N.M. St. Ct. R. 
15-304 (West 2012). New Mexico also has a statutory statement of 
duties identical to the Field Code. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-10 (West 
2010). 
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oversight than of deliberate decision. Disciplinary bodies and courts 
do not enforce the duty.246  
D. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct to replace the Model Code.247 The Model Rules were in a 
“restatement format” in order to give better guidance and clarity for 
enforcement “because the only enforceable standards were the black-
letter Rules.” 248  The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons 
altogether and reduced the emphasis on the narrative discussion. The 
Model Rules are the ABA’s current standards for proper litigation 
conduct of lawyers. Many, but not all states, have adopted some 
version of the Model Rules as their regulatory standards for lawyers. 
The Model Rules have a single chapter governing litigation 
standards, entitled “Advocate.”249 This chapter has a number of rules 
imposing duties of reasonable behavior and truth. Rule 3.4 sets out 
several prohibitions against unreasonable behavior to promote “[f]air 
competition in the adversary system.”250 Rule 3.3 imposes multiple 
truth duties. It bars use of false evidence and requires a lawyer to 
remedy any false evidence, which might include disclosure to the 
court.251  
Rule 3.1, entitled “Meritorious Claims and Contentions,” states a 
duty of objective merit for civil filings.252 It requires that claims and 
defenses both have legal and factual merit, under an objective “not 
frivolous” standard.253 The drafters reported that they used the “not 
frivolous” standard, “rather than one based upon the concepts ‘harass’ 
or ‘malicious injure,’” which both the Canons of Ethics and Model 
 
246. See Andrews, Lawyer’s Oath, supra note 8, at 54–55 (discussing lack of 
enforcement and regulatory role of modern oaths). 
247. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, Legislative History, supra note 2, at 
ix–xi (reporting on legislative history for each rule from the original 
1983 adoption of Model Rules and subsequent amendments through 
2005). 
248. Id. at xii–xiv (discussing the debate at the 1982 ABA Midyear Meeting 
concerning a format change from a Model Code to the Model Rules). 
249. Rules 3.1–3.9, which govern litigation, are part of this Chapter. See 
Ellen J. Bennett et al., Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, at v–vi (7th ed. 2011). 
250. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.4 cmt. (2009). 
251. R. 3.3. 
252. R. 3.1. Model Rule 3.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.” Id. 
253.  Id. 
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Code had used in different ways, to more closely track the “prevailing 
standard in the law of procedure.”254  
The reference to procedure likely was to Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which, as of December 1, 1983, imposed an 
objective merit standard.255 Yet Rule 11 also retained an independent 
motive standard. Under Rule 11, a party presenting a civil paper 
certifies both that the paper has factual and legal merit and that the 
paper is not being presented for an improper purpose.256 The ABA 
standards, however, moved beyond the procedural rules by 
eliminating motive as a test for civil filings. In 2001, the ABA 
removed language in a comment to Model Rule 3.1 that had 
suggested a claim could be frivolous if the plaintiff had an ill motive 
in asserting it.257 
Overall, the Model Rules downplay zealous advocacy, especially 
as compared to the Model Code. The strongest statement of this 
concept is in the Preamble to the Model Rules, which uses zealous 
advocacy to describe one of the fundamental roles of a lawyer: “As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the 
rules of adversary system.” 258 Yet none of the litigation rules in the 
“Advocate” chapter or their related comments mentions zealous 
advocacy. The black-letter rules themselves never state a duty of 
zealous advocacy. Model Rule 1.3 provides that a lawyer “shall act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”259 
Although the comment to Model Rule 1.3 mentions zealous advocacy 
 
254. Am. Bar Ass’n, Legislative History, supra note 2, at 422. 
255. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (providing for a reasonable inquiry before 
certifying the legal and factual merit of the civil paper). There are 
numerous other rules of court and procedural laws that regulate both 
the conduct of the client and of the lawyer and which impose a variety 
of merit and motive standards. For a general review of these standards, 
see Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 208, at 691–746.  
256. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) (providing that signature certifies that the 
civil paper is “not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation”). 
257. Comment [2] to Rule 3.1 originally provided that litigation filings were 
frivolous “if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the 
purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person.” Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Legislative History, supra note 2, at 423; id at 424 (dropping the 
reference to the client’s purpose to harass “because the client’s purpose 
is not relevant to the objective merits of the client’s claim”); see also 
Andrews, First Amendment Problem, supra note 225, at 29–31 
(criticizing the comment). 
258. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. 2 (listing the lawyer’s roles 
in paragraph [2] of the preamble). 
259. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3. 
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as part of this duty, that statement is immediately qualified.260 During 
the promulgation of the Model Rules, the American College of Trial 
Lawyers proposed inserting “zeal” into the text of the black-letter 
rule, in place of “diligence,” but the proposed amendment was 
withdrawn.261 The Model Rules as adopted by most states do not 
state zeal as an affirmative duty.262 
The Model Rules do not state a just-cause duty. Although the 
Model Rules do not require a lawyer to consider the justness of a civil 
client’s cause, they seemingly permit a lawyer to do so. Any 
recognition in the Model Rules of zealous advocacy is not so strong 
that a lawyer is not permitted to consider the justness of a civil 
client’s cause. 263  Accordingly, the Model Rules seem to take an 
agnostic position. Rule 1.2 states that a lawyer’s representation of the 
client “does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, 
economic, social or moral views or activities.”264 Thus, unlike the 
traditional just-cause duty of the Field Code, Model Rule 1.2 purports 
to give the lawyer the freedom to take a case that the lawyer 
personally believes is unjust. Yet the Model Rules also permit a 
lawyer to reject a cause that the lawyer believes to be unjust. The 
Model Rules do not require any lawyer to take any particular civil 
matter.265   
260. R. 1.3 cmt. (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication 
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.”). In 2002, the ABA amended the comments to Rule 1.3 to add 
civility language and move a procrastination and “work load” reference 
to a separate paragraph. Am. Bar Ass’n, Legislative History, supra 
note 2, at 63. 
261. The sponsor of the amendment stated: “Zeal connotes strong motivation 
and extraordinary effort. This is exactly what an attorney should render 
to his client. Diligence, on the other hand, connotes merely adequate 
professionalism and adequate effort.” Am. Bar Ass’n, Legislative 
History, supra note 2, at 62.  
262. See Gillers, Simon & Perlman, supra note 171, at 47–48 (listing the 
diligence requirements as adopted by some states). Massachusetts is an 
exception and added zeal to its version of Rule 1.3: “The lawyer should 
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.” Id. at 48. 
263. The Model Rules impose a somewhat greater degree of zealousness on 
criminal defense lawyers due to concerns as to the constitutional 
protections afforded criminal defendants. For example, under Model 
Rule 3.3, a criminal defense lawyer cannot refuse to offer his client’s 
testimony if the lawyer only believes (but does not know) the testimony 
is false, but a civil defense lawyer may refuse to offer his client’s 
testimony based on belief alone. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 3.3(a)(3) (2009). 
264. R. 1.2(b). 
265. The only limitations on declining new matters are stated in Model Rule 
6.2, which deals with court appointed representations and do not apply 
to most civil cases. R. 6.2. 
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It is somewhat more difficult to discern the Model Rule position 
as to what a lawyer can do when the lawyer has agreed to represent 
the client and later considers the cause unjust. Under Rule 2.1, the 
lawyer is free to counsel the client as to “moral, economic, social and 
political factors.” 266  After such counseling, Rule 1.2 requires the 
lawyer to “abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation.”267 If a client insists upon an objective that the lawyer 
believes to be unjust, the lawyer’s only potential option is withdrawal. 
The question is whether this belief—that the client’s objective is 
unjust—is sufficient grounds for seeking withdrawal. 
Model Rule 1.16 limits a lawyer’s ability to withdraw from an 
existing representation in a civil case. First, Model Rule 1.16(b) gives 
the lawyer complete discretion to withdraw so long as there is no 
“material adverse effect on the interests of the client.”268 Model Rule 
1.16(b) then provides limited circumstances under which a lawyer 
may withdraw even if the result to the client would be a material 
adverse effect.269 One such circumstance is a case in which the client’s 
objective is “repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement,”270 and another is “other good cause for withdrawal 
exists.”271 To most observers, but perhaps not all, an unjust cause 
would be both repugnant and fundamentally disagreeable. This broad 
language thus seemingly permits the lawyer to withdraw in civil cases 
in which the lawyer comes to believe that the client’s cause is not 
just.  
Finally, Model Rule 1.16(a) affirmatively requires a lawyer to 
withdraw if the representation would violate “the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law.”272 A violation of the just-cause 
duties still in force in some states seemingly would require withdrawal 
under this “other law” language.273 These clauses may be overlooked, 
but in the several states in which a just-cause duty is in effect, the 
duty both provides the lawyer with the discretion to withdraw from a 
matter that the lawyer believes is unjust and requires the lawyer to 
do so. 
 
266. R. 2.1. 
267. R. 1.2(a). 
268.  R. 1.16(b)(1). 
269.  See R. 1.16(b)(2)–(7) (listing different reason for which a lawyer may 
withdrawal). 
270.  R. 1.16(b)(4). 
271. R. 1.16(b)(7).  
272. R. 1.16(a). 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 234–46 (discussing just-cause duties 
that exist in some states). 
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Thus, under the current ABA model ethical standards, a lawyer 
in civil litigation has a duty to be diligent but not necessarily zealous. 
The lawyer’s advocacy is limited by the superior duties of reasonable 
behavior, truth, and objective merit. The ABA has moved to 
objective merit, leaving behind just cause and motive as litigation 
standards. Under the ABA model standards, the lawyer may decline a 
matter that the lawyer considers unjust and also may withdraw on 
this ground. All of this is muddled by the fact that the ABA sets only 
model ethical standards. In practice, the states have a patchwork of 
litigation standards that may retain the Model Code emphasis on 
zealous advocacy, the Field Code just-cause duty, or both. Procedural 
rules, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, continue to impose 
proper motive as an additional limitation.  
Conclusion 
This historical review shows that, despite the many turns of 
phrases and revision of standards, the substance of the core concepts 
of proper litigation behavior has remained remarkably constant over 
the centuries. Society always has put limits on advocacy in civil 
litigation. Reasonable behavior and truth are core values that 
consistently have trumped any duties owed to the client. The point of 
debate has been a narrow, albeit important, point of conflict between 
a duty of zealous advocacy and a duty of just cause or some 
alternative limit on advocacy.  
Throughout much of the early history, client concerns were not 
the focus of formal regulatory standards. Beginning in the nineteenth 
century and more fully emerging in the ABA Model Code, client 
concerns became more prominent. Scores of professional conduct 
standards now address client concerns. To many modern practicing 
lawyers, zealous advocacy is chief among these client duties.274 This is 
an overstatement, in terms of both the current standards and the 
historical standards. Today, under most states’ legal ethics regimes, 
zeal is not literally a duty at all, in terms of the black-letter rules that 
govern lawyers’ conduct. Instead, the regulatory duty is one of 
reasonable diligence, which, as the comments to Model Rule 1.3 
suggest, can include “zeal in advocacy,” as well as workload 
 
274. E.g., Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The ‘Z’ Words and 
Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 
S.C. L. Rev. 549, 569, 598 (2002) (claiming that the “phrase ‘zealous 
advocacy’ is frequently invoked to defend unprofessional behavior and a 
‘Rambo’ or ‘win at all costs,’ attitude” and that “[d]ue to Rambo’s 
conduct, there is a growing concern in the judiciary, the bar, and society 
about the importance of lawyer professionalism and civility”); see also 
Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical 
Deliberation as Ethical Obligations, 37 Ind. L. Rev. 21, 23 (2003) 
(surveying “alternative models of legal ethics”). 
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management.275 And, that duty, whether phrased in terms of diligence 
or zeal, is limited. The comment to Model Rule 1.3 immediately 
qualifies its requirement of zeal by explaining that the duty does not 
include an obligation “to press for every advantage.”276  
This is not new. Virtually all prominent past statements of zeal 
have been qualified by higher duties. For example, Lord Whitelocke in 
1648 spoke of a lawyer’s “zeal of his client’s cause,”277 and Sharswood 
in 1854 made “warm zeal” for the client’s cause the “moral 
responsibility” of the lawyer.278 Yet both expressly conditioned zeal on 
higher obligations to the court. Even the Model Code, which was the 
most prominent regulatory statement of zealous representation, 
qualified the zeal duty with the caveat “within the bounds of the 
law.”279  
The question over time was the nature of the court duties that 
limited advocacy in civil litigation. The area of uncertainty was not 
reasonable behavior or truth—those were well-recognized constants—
but instead the additional limits beyond reasonable behavior and 
truth. Model Rule 3.1 represents the end result, or more accurately 
the current point, of the evolution of this additional limit.  
The early European oaths began by stating what today seems to 
be the broadest limit, a duty to assess the justness of the client’s 
cause beyond its technical truth. Early American lawyers were not 
bound by this additional duty until the Field Code. Alabama rejected 
this clause and substituted a motive limitation for civil plaintiffs. The 
ABA’s 1908 Canons of Ethics used the Alabama motive standard but 
broadened the standard to cover civil defenses. The Model Code 
substituted an effect test for the motive standard and added a test of 
objective legal merit. The Model Rules eliminated the motive 
standard. Model Rule 3.1 today states an objective factual and legal 
merit standard that broadly applies to all aspects of civil litigation.  
Although the additional duty to assess the justness of the client’s 
cause may have been ill-defined, the problem, if any, was the 
appropriate criterion, not the priority of this additional duty. Today, 
the just-cause duty largely has transformed into an objective merit 
standard, but this new standard overrides zealous advocacy, as did 
the older versions of the just-cause or proper-motive duties. Under 
current ethical and procedural standards, a lawyer may not file a 
frivolous paper no matter how helpful it would be to the zealous 
representation of the client.  
 
275. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 
276. R. 1.3 cmt.  
277. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
278. See supra text accompanying notes 111–17. 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 213, 215. 
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Moreover, the history shows that the just-cause standard has 
faded only with regard to its status as an affirmative duty. Unlike 
advocates in earlier eras, a lawyer today may represent his client even 
if the lawyer does not personally believe the cause to be just. The 
lawyer no longer must decline or withdraw from the matter. On the 
other hand, zealous advocacy does not now require a lawyer 
affirmatively to override his personal sense of justice to accept a client 
in civil litigation. Later, the lawyer likely may withdraw on this basis, 
and to the extent that the just-cause duty lingers in oath form in 
some states, the lawyer arguably must withdraw.  
Even Professor Freedman, one of the most outspoken supporters 
of zealous advocacy, has stated that a lawyer should use his own 
moral discretion to decline a civil client.280 Where Professor Freedman 
takes issue with modern rules and standards is the lawyer’s duties 
after the lawyer accepts the representation. For this reason, Professor 
Freedman favors the Model Code over the Model Rules position.281 
The current Model Rules give the lawyer discretion to decline civil 
representation, but they apparently give the lawyer more leeway than 
the Model Code to withdraw from civil cases, likely including a case 
that the lawyer considers unjust.282  
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the just-cause duty, as an 
affirmative duty, essentially is absent from our modern understanding 
of a civil litigator’s ethical duties. Lawyers are not meaningfully 
instructed to decline or withdraw from civil matters that are 
otherwise truthful and reasonable solely because the lawyer deems the 
cause “unjust.” Lawyers apparently are not ethically disciplined for 
failure to do so. 
By contrast, a lawyer has no discretion and little uncertainty as 
to the duties of truth and reasonable behavior. These duties always 
have trumped conflicting duties to the client. Moreover, these two 
court duties, for the most part, have been well defined. From the very 
 
280. Professor Freedman frames a lawyer’s moral accountability as follows: 
Lawyers are morally accountable. A lawyer can be “called to 
account” and is not “beyond reproof” for the decision to accept 
a particular client or cause. Also, while representing a client, the 
lawyer should counsel the client regarding the moral aspects of 
the representation. If a lawyer chooses to represent a client, 
however, it would be immoral as well as unprofessional for the 
lawyer, either by concealment or coercion, to deprive the client 
of lawful rights that the client elects to pursue after appropriate 
counseling. 
FREEDMAN, Understanding Ethics, supra note 1, at 71. 
281. See id. at 58–64 (discussing Model Code and Model Rules positions and 
concluding that “the Model Code is clearly preferable to the Model 
Rules”).  
282. See supra text accompanying notes 265–71. 
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beginning, lawyers have known that they must act reasonably in 
litigation: they may not maliciously delay and burden the other party, 
and they must not use foul or harassing words or methods. Likewise, 
lawyers always have known that they must be honest in civil 
litigation: the lawyer may not offer false evidence, may not misstate 
the law, and must correct falsehoods when the lawyer learns of any.  
This last aspect of the truth duty—the duty to report or correct 
falsehoods—underscores the primacy of the truth duty. And its 
persistence over the centuries underscores its near-universal acceptance. 
The Justinian oath, fifteen centuries ago, required lawyers to refrain 
from causes that were “dishonest” or “composed of false allegations” 
and required a lawyer to “utterly separate” himself if he were to learn 
that the suit was of this sort.283 The English “do no falsehood” oath 
required lawyers to report falsehoods to the court.284 Likewise, today, 
Model Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer to remedy false evidence, including, 
if necessary, disclosure to the court in civil cases.285 This Model Rule 
provision is not a new-age limit on advocacy. It is a duty dating back 
to the beginning of the profession. 
In sum, over the centuries, the proper balance of litigation duties 
has been a fairly narrow issue. The debate rarely has extended to the 
duties of honest and reasonable behavior. Lawyers personally may 
struggle in their attempt to live up to those standards in particular 
situations, and some scholars may question them,286 but the standards 
themselves have been constant. The effort has been to define how a 
lawyer must assess the client’s cause beyond its technical truth. That 
narrow question has been the primary “soft spot” in the evolution of 
 
283. Justinian Code, supra note 20, lib. 3, tit. 1, l. 14. 
284. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. 
285. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3) (2009). 
286. Professor Freedman acknowledges the primacy of the truth standard but 
argues that lawyers may ethically breach this standard in some 
circumstances, even in court: 
Three ethical rules that are universally recognized, and that are 
unquestionably sound and desirable, are that a lawyer shall not 
make a false statement of fact to a court, that a lawyer shall not 
make a false statement of material fact to a third person, and that a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation. Yet, there are circumstances in which 
zealous representation, which embraces the ethical requirements of 
competence and confidentiality, can require a lawyer to make a 
false statement to a court or to a third person, or to engage in other 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying 
to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 
Hofstra L. Rev. 771, 772 (2006). See generally Freedman, 
Understanding Ethics, supra note 1. 
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litigation ethics standards. The question has never been whether such 
an additional duty exists, but instead the nature of that duty. Over 
the centuries, this duty has narrowed from a broad notion of just 
cause to a standard of objective factual and legal merit. Moreover, the 
question has never been the priority of these duties to the court. 
Lawyers today, just as centuries ago, owe paramount duties to the 
court. Litigation fairness is and always has been a core value of the 
profession. 
  
 
   
